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369 
THIRD STRIKE OR MERELY A FOUL TIP?: THE GROSS 
DISPROPORTIONALITY OF LOCKYER V. ANDRADE1   
 
“Let the punishment match the offense.”2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“The United States is besieged by an incarceration crisis which far 
surpasses that of any other nation.”3  Scholars attribute the increasing 
prison population to changes in sentencing policy.4  Politicians have 
used the public pressure resulting from its fear of violence to pass 
legislation that supports this change in policy and creates more fixed 
sentencing structures.5 
California’s Three Strikes law (Three Strikes), an example of such 
a structure, has resulted in the largest increase in the prison population.6  
 
 1. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
 2. The Quotations Page, Cicero, at http://www.quotationspage.com (last visited Nov. 7, 
2003).  Cicero, a lawyer and member of the Roman Senate, was born in 106 B.C.  Roman 
Philosophy, Cicero, at http://www.wsu.edu:8000/ ~dee/ROME/CICERO.HTM (last visited Nov. 7, 
2003).  Eighteenth century Americans, including the framers of the Constitution and the Declaration 
of Independence, studied Cicero’s writings as part of their education.  Id. 
 3. Lisa E. Cowart, Comment, Legislative Prerogative vs. Judicial Discretion: California’s 
Three Strikes Law Takes a Hit, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 615, 616 (1998).  The United States has the 
world’s largest prison system, with over two million people in American prisons and jails.  Marc 
Mauer, Introduction: The Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1491, 
1491-92 (2003) [hereinafter Mauer, Collateral Consequences]. 
 4. Mauer, Collateral Consequences, supra note 3, at 1491.  The surge in prison population is 
due largely in part to a change in sentencing policies.  Id.  The trend has moved from indeterminate 
sentencing to more fixed sentencing.  Id.  These fixed sentencing guidelines include mandatory 
minimum sentencing and three strikes policies, discussed within this note.  Id. 
 5. Cowart, supra note 3, at 616-17.  “Politicians, including presidential candidates, often 
prey on constituents’ fears in advancing their own electoral purposes.”  Id.  Forty-seven percent of 
Americans in the year 2000 believed that crime had increased since the past year.  Gary LaFree, Too 
Much Democracy or Too Much Crime? Lessons from California’s Three-Strikes Law, 27 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 875, 898 (2002) (book review). Sixty-eight percent of Americans in 2000 believed 
that criminals are not dealt with harshly enough by the courts.  Id. at 899.  As of 2000, sixty-three 
percent of Americans believed in the death penalty.  Id. 
 6. See infra note 225 (discussing the number of offenders incarcerated in California under 
Three Strikes since its inception). 
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Public pressure, spurred by the fear of violent criminals being released 
and committing the same crimes again and again, led to the enactment of 
Three Strikes.7  However, the public, who now finds problems with this 
law and its disproportionate impact, has retracted their support for it.8  
Three Strikes is so disproportionate that an offender can be sentenced to 
life imprisonment for stealing a $20 bottle of vitamins9 or shoplifting a 
single magazine.10 
The decision in Lockyer illuminates Three Strikes’ disproportionate 
impact.11  In this case, the sentence given under Three Strikes was so 
grossly disproportionate to the offense that it rose to the level of cruel 
and unusual punishment.12  The trial court completely ignored on-point 
precedent from a materially indistinguishable case that held a similar 
sentence grossly disproportionate and a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.13  By misapplying Supreme Court precedent and imposing 
 
 7. See infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons behind the passage 
of Three Strikes). 
 8. See Walter L. Gordon III, California’s Three Strikes Law: Tyranny of the Majority, 20 
WHITTIER L. REV. 577, 599 (1999).  See also infra note 218 (discussing how the main proponent of 
Three Strikes stopped supporting the law).  “In the first three strikes case in San Francisco, the 
seventy-one year old victim refused to testify at the preliminary hearing, even after the judge 
threatened to jail her.”  Gordon, supra, at 599.  The defendant was facing sentencing under Three 
Strikes because he had been convicted of eleven previous felonies and burglary of the victim’s car.  
Id.  Most of the defendant’s other felonies were for burglary.  Id.  The victim did not believe the law 
was just and, therefore, she refused to testify.  Id.  In Santa Clara County, a jury refused to return a 
guilty verdict for drug possession after learning that the defendant would be sentenced under Three 
Strikes.  Id.  A Santa Barbara Municipal Court Judge reduced a felony charge to a misdemeanor in 
order to avoid sentencing the defendant under Three Strikes.  Id. at 602.  During the process, she 
called the law “a piece of junk” and “a stupid piece of law.”  Gordon, supra, at 602. 
 9. Marc Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?: Despite the Promises of 
Political Leaders and Others Who Have Promoted Them as Effective Tools for Fighting Crime, 
“Tough on Crime” Policies Have Proved to be Costly and Unjust, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 9, 9 
(1999) [hereinafter Mauer, Promises].  Michael Riggs, a man with prior convictions, stole vitamins 
from a supermarket store.  Id.  He had been homeless and a drug addict since the death of his son.  
Id.  For his “crime” he received the sentence of 25 years to life imprisonment.  Id.  This 
disproportionate effect is exacerbated by pointing out that Riggs’ offense, when not prosecuted 
under Three Strikes, carries only a six-month sentence.  Id. 
 10. B.E. WITKIN, NORMAN L. EPSTEIN & MEMBERS OF THE WITKIN LEGAL INSTITUTE, 
WITKIN & EPSTEIN CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 355, (3d ed. Supp. 2003) [hereinafter WITKIN & 
EPSTEIN].  Romero received a sentence of 25 years to life imprisonment for this petty theft because 
his past convictions for lewd conduct and battery subjected him to sentencing under Three Strikes.  
Id.; People v. Romero, 99 Cal. App. 4th 1418, 1424 (2002). 
 11. See infra notes 146-54 and accompanying text (discussing Lockyer and the Supreme 
Court’s decision). 
 12. See infra notes 185-203 and accompanying text (discussing why the Lockyer decision was 
unconstitutional). 
 13. See infra notes 127, 200-03 and accompanying text (discussing that Solem v. Helm, 463 
U.S. 277 (1983) overruled by Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) is on-point with Lockyer 
and the trial court ignored it). 
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a grossly disproportionate sentence, the trial court acted 
unconstitutionally in its sentencing.14 
This Note will explore the proportionality of Three Strikes, issues 
implicated by the law, and whether the legislation should continue to 
exist.15  Section II discusses the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act, Three Strikes, and the three major cases dealing with 
sentencing proportionality.16  Section III discusses Lockyer v. Andrade 
and its history.17  Section IV discusses whether there is a proportionality 
principle attached to the Eighth Amendment, whether the policy goals 
behind Three Strikes are being achieved, whether Three Strikes is 
economically efficient, and whether Three Strikes has caused any 
adverse effects on convicts or the judicial system.18 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Eighth Amendment 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects 
against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.19  The Fourteenth 
Amendment20 applies the Eighth Amendment to the States.21  The Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments 
contains a gross disproportionality provision.22 
 
 14. See infra notes 196-98 and accompanying text (discussing the disproportionality of the 
sentence in Lockyer). 
 15. See infra notes 155-203 and accompanying text (discussing whether there is a 
proportionality principle in the Eighth Amendment and whether Andrade’s sentence was 
proportional).  See also infra notes 204-47 and accompanying text (discussing the economic and 
policy reasons behind Three Strikes and whether the law is efficient and effective). 
 16. See infra notes 19-110 and accompanying text for Section II. 
 17. See infra  notes 111-154 for Section III. 
 18. See infra notes 155-247 for Section IV. 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”  Id. 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.  No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Id. 
 21. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962 (1991) (applying the Eighth Amendment to the 
States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 22. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003).  “A gross disproportionality principle is 
applicable to sentences for terms of years.”  Id.  But see Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994-95.  Mandatory 
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B.  Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)23 
The AEDPA places limitations on a “federal habeas court’s review 
of a state-court decision”24 and is used by courts when deciding whether 
a sentence is grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.25  
When deciding whether a petition for a writ of habeas corpus26 should be 
issued, the most important question under the AEDPA is “whether a 
state court decision is contrary to,27 or involved an unreasonable 
application of,28 clearly established29 Federal law.”30 
 
sentences are not prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.  Id.  Although they may be cruel, they are 
not unusual.  Id. at 994-95.  The Court found that simply because a sentence is mandatory does not 
qualify it as cruel and unusual if it was not otherwise so.  Id. at 995. 
 23. S.735. 104th Cong. § 104 (1996) (limiting federal habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 
(1996)). 
 24. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70. 
 25. Id.  An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to 
the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on 
the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim – (1) resulted in a decision 
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.  28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) (1996).  AEDPA 
“modified a federal habeas court’s role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent 
federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent 
possible under law.”  Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). 
 26. Habeas corpus is defined as “[a] writ employed to bring a person before a court, most 
frequently to ensure that the party’s imprisonment or detention is not illegal.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 715 (7th ed. 1999).  In 1867, Congress enacted a statute providing that federal courts 
“shall have the power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be 
restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or any treaty or law of the United 
States.”  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 374-75 (2000) (citing Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 
14 Stat. 385). 
 27. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71. 
[A] state court decision is “contrary to our clearly established precedent if the state court 
applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases” or “if the state 
court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the 
Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent.” 
Id. at 73 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-406; Bell, 535 U.S. at 694).  For example, in Lockyer, the 
California Court of Appeal’s decision must have been contrary to the “clearly established gross 
proportionality principle.”  Id. 
 28. Id. at 75.  A state court unreasonably applies Federal law if it “identifies the correct 
governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that 
principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.”  Id.  The state court’s application must be “objectively 
unreasonable” not merely “incorrect or erroneous.”  Id.  (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 413).  
“Section 2254(d)(1) permits a federal court to grant habeas relief based on the application of a 
governing legal principle to a set of facts different from those of the case in which the principle was 
announced.”  Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 76. 
 29. Id. at 71-72.  “Clearly established” law is the United States Supreme Court’s holdings not 
dictum, as of the time the state court made its decision.  Id.  A federal habeas court can only apply 
law that existed “at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.”  Williams, 529 U.S. at 381 
(quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989)).  “A rule that ‘breaks new ground or imposes a 
new obligation on the States or the Federal Government, falls outside this universe of federal law.”  
4
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C.  California’s Three Strikes Law (Three Strikes) 
Three Strikes was first proposed by Mike Reynolds, a father whose 
daughter was murdered.31  Three Strikes’ ultimate passage was most 
importantly influenced by the murder of Polly Klaas.32  After this 
murder, then California Governor Pete Wilson33 picked up on Three 
Strikes as important crime-fighting legislation.34  Democrats controlled 
the state legislature and they agreed to pass any crime legislation 
proposed by Wilson, a Republican, in order to prevent him from using 
the issue to gain reelection.35  Three Strikes was signed into law on 
March 7, 1994, with almost no analysis by academics or criminal justice 
experts.36 
Three Strikes requires a court to impose a sentence twice as long as 
 
Id. at 381.  Only decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States are relevant law under the 
AEDPA.  Id.  A generalized standard may be sufficiently clear for habeas purposes.  Id. at 382.  “If 
the rule in question is one which of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence, 
then we can tolerate a number of specific applications without saying that those applications 
themselves create a new rule.”  Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308-09 (1992). 
 30. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).  The Supreme Court concedes 
that determining what is “clearly established” under Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is difficult.  
Id.  Nevertheless, gross disproportionality is one “clearly established” principle.  Id. 
 31. LaFree, supra note 5, at 876 (discussing the history of Three Strikes).  Mike Reynolds is a 
photographer from Fresno whose 18-year-old daughter, Kimber Reynolds, had been shot in the head 
on June 30, 1992 “during an attempted robbery of her purse as she exited a local restaurant.”  Id.  
See also Autumn D. McCullogh, Note and Comment, Three Strikes and You’re In (For Life): An 
Analysis of the California Three Strikes Law as Applied to Convictions for Misdemeanor Conduct, 
24 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 277, 279 (2002) (discussing why Three Strikes was promulgated).  
Michael Davis, a convicted criminal, was linked to Kimber’s death and subsequently killed by 
police officers outside an apartment building.  Id. at 280 n.17.  Douglas David Walker was also 
linked to Kimber’s death.  Id.  He pled to a lesser charge and was only sentenced to nine years in 
prison.  Id. 
 32. LaFree, supra note 5, at 876-77 (discussing why Three Strikes was promulgated).  Polly 
Klaas, a twelve year old girl, was abducted from her home in Petaluma, California in October 1993 
by a violent offender who had been convicted twice previously and recently been paroled from state 
prison.  Id. at 877.  He confessed to sexually assaulting and murdering Polly and led police to her 
body.  Id. 
 33. Peter Wilson was born in Illinois on August 23, 1933. California Governors, at 
http://www.calvoter.org/archive/94general/cond/governor/wills/bro.html.  He graduated from Yale 
and served as a Marine before earning a University of California law degree.  Id.  He served as a 
Senator, Mayor of San Diego, and Assemblyman, as well as Governor of California.  Id.  He brags 
about being the first governor to “turn career criminals into career inmates.”  California Voter 
Foundation, Remarks by Governor Pete Wilson on Primary Night (June 7, 1994), available at  
http://www.calvoter.org/archive/94general/cand/governor/wils/wilsspeech1.htm.  He also holds 
particular dislike for rapists and child molesters stating that “for those animals, their first strike 
should be their last.”  Id. 
 34. Lafree, supra note 5, at 877. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id.  There was no time for analytical attention because of time pressures imposed by 
public outrage over the Polly Klaas case.  Id. 
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the one a defendant would have received if the defendant has one prior 
strike and is convicted of another felony.37  A defendant who is 
convicted of a felony and who has two or more prior strikes must receive 
an indeterminate sentence.38  A prior strike consists of a serious or 
violent crime.39  However, the offense that triggers the enhanced 
sentencing may be any felony.40  A third strike may also be a “wobbler 
offense,” which can be charged either as a misdemeanor or as a felony.41  
Wobbler offenses are of particular significance when it comes to petty 
theft.42 
Three Strikes is one of the harshest recidivist statutes43 in the 
United States.44  For example, double counting is incorporated into 
 
 37. McCullogh, supra note 31, at 281 (discussing the voters’ intent in passing Three Strikes).  
See infra note 39 and accompanying text (defining what a prior strike is). 
 38. McCullogh, supra note 31, at 281.  “[T]he minimum term of [this indeterminate sentence] 
is the greater of three possibilities: 1) three times the sentence for the current felony conviction; 2) 
state imprisonment for twenty-five years; or 3) the sentence as determined by the court for the 
instant conviction, plus any applicable enhancements.”  Id.  Each of these sentencing options 
guarantees that the minimum sentenced received will be twenty-five years to life.  Id.  This structure 
also ensures that there will be no eligibility for parole until twenty-five years have been served.  Id. 
 39. Id.  Violent crimes include “murder, mayhem, rape, forcible sex crimes, child molestation, 
robbery, and kidnapping.”  Id. at 281-82.  There are twenty-seven serious crimes including 
“burglary, arson, and providing illegal drugs to a minor.”  McCullogh, supra note 31, at 282.  
Juvenile adjudications and out-of-state convictions qualify as prior strikes if they meet the serious or 
violent definition as determined by California law.  Id. at 283. 
 40. Id.  There are “over 500 offenses classified as felonies in California.”  Id. at 282. 
 41. Andrade v. Attorney Gen. of California, 270 F.3d 743, 749 (9th Cir. 2001) rev’d, 538 U.S. 
63 (2003).  A “wobbler” offense is punishable by up to one year in county jail as a misdemeanor or 
up to three years in state prison as a felony.  Id.  A prosecutor has discretion to charge a “wobbler” 
offense as either a felony or a misdemeanor.  Id.  A Judge has discretion to reduce a felony charge 
to a misdemeanor at sentencing.  Id.  Examples of “‘wobbler offenses’ are: petty theft with a prior, 
receiving stolen property, grand theft, commercial burglary, and possession of methamphetamines.”  
See Alex Ricciardulli, The Broken Safety Valve: Judicial Discretion’s Failure to Ameliorate 
Punishment Under California’s Three Strikes Law, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 22 n.109 (2002) (listing 
other “wobbler” offenses). 
 42. McCullogh, supra note 31, at 282 (giving an overview of Three Strikes).  “If petty theft is 
committed subsequent to prior convictions for non-theft offenses, even where the priors are serious 
and/or violent, then the petty theft must be charged as a misdemeanor and will not trigger three 
strikes sentencing.”  Id.  “If, however, petty theft is committed after a prior theft conviction, the 
petty theft will be charged as petty theft with a prior, a felony that will subject the defendant to three 
strikes sentencing.”  Id. 
 43. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1276 (7th ed. 1999).  A recidivist statute is one directed at 
the sentencing of criminals who have been “convicted of multiple offenses.”  See id. 
 44. McCullogh, supra note 31, at 282 (comparing Three Strikes to other recidivist statutes).  
A court cannot suspend a prison sentence or grant probation.  Id.  An offender can only be 
committed to state prison.  Id.  The length of time between the prior strikes and the triggering 
offense is not considered a mitigating factor.  Id. at 282-83.  The terms of imprisonment must be 
imposed consecutively as opposed to concurrently.  Id. at 283.  Good-time and work-time credits, 
which can reduce a convicted criminal’s sentence, are drastically limited.  Id.  Offenders cannot 
receive such credits until actually in prison and 80% of their sentence must be served before they 
6
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Three Strikes.45  Three Strikes also “imposes certain obligations and 
powers upon the prosecution”46 such as the prosecutor must plead and 
prove all prior strikes and the prosecutor may dismiss prior strikes 
because it is in the interest of justice to do so or because of insufficient 
evidence.47  Three Strikes targets career criminals because they pose the 
“greatest threat to public safety.”48 
D.  Major Precedents 
1.  Rummel v. Estelle49 
In 1973, Rummel was convicted of obtaining $120.75 by false 
pretenses.50  Since Rummel had two prior convictions, which qualified 
 
are eligible to receive such credits.  McCullogh, supra note 31, at 283.  Offenders who are 
sentenced to indeterminate life sentences must serve their entire minimum term before they can be 
eligible for parole.  Id.  “[T]wo prior strikes can result from a single past criminal act.”  Id. 
 45. Id.  Double counting occurs because “a prior strike conviction can both trigger a second or 
third strike sentence and increase the sentence for the current offense by an additional five years 
under an earlier sentencing enhancement for serious felonies.”  Id.  “[T]he same conviction that can 
trigger a second or third strike sentence may also increase the sentence by an additional year if the 
prior strike conviction resulted in a prison commitment.”  Id.  “[A] prior strike can further be used 
to simultaneously trigger a second or third strike sentence and to provide an element of the current 
offense, as in the crimes of felony petty theft with a prior and felon in possession of a weapon.”  
McCullogh, supra note 31, at 283.  “‘[S]erious’ or ‘violent’ felony convictions imposed prior to the 
law’s enactment in 1994 can be charged as strikes.”  Andrade, 270 F.3d at 747 (citing People v. 
Kinsey, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1621, 1631 (1995)). 
 46. McCullough, supra note 31, at 283. 
 47. Id. at 283-84 (discussing the safety valve provided by Three Strikes).  By giving the 
prosecutor the power to dismiss prior strikes, Three Strikes gives prosecutors broad discretion.  Id. 
at 284.  This ability to dismiss prior strikes in the interest of justice is extended to the trial court.  Id.  
However, a trial court’s power to dismiss prior strikes is more limited than the prosecutor’s.  Id.  
The trial court must consider “both the constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests of 
society represented by the People, in determining whether there should be a dismissal.”  Id. 
 48. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24 (2003).  “As one of the chief architects of 
California’s three strikes law has explained: ‘Three Strikes was intended to go beyond simply 
making sentences tougher.’”  Id. (quoting James A. Ardaiz, California’s Three Strikes Law: 
History, Expectations, Consequences, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 12 (2000)).  “‘It was intended to be 
a focused effort to create a sentencing policy that would use the judicial system to reduce serious 
and violent crime.’”  Id. (quoting Ardaiz, supra).  The policy choice behind any three strikes law is 
that “individuals who have repeatedly engaged in serious or violent criminal behavior, and whose 
conduct has not been deterred by more conventional approaches to punishment, must be isolated 
from society in order to protect the public safety.”  Id. 
 49. 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (holding that state legislatures have discretion in deciding sentencing 
guidelines). 
 50. Id. at 266.  Rummel promised to repair an air conditioner and accepted payment to do so.  
Id. at 286 (Powell, J., dissenting).  The air conditioner was never repaired.  Id.  Because the amount 
was greater than $50 this offense was felony theft.  Id.  Felony theft is punishable by two to ten 
years in the state penitentiary.  Id. at 266. 
7
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as prior strikes,51 the prosecutor proceeded against Rummel as a 
recidivist.52  The jury found Rummel guilty of felony theft and also 
found that he had been convicted of two prior felonies.53  Rummel was 
sentenced to life imprisonment in the state penitentiary.54  Rummel 
appealed his sentence as cruel and unusual punishment.55 
The United States Supreme Court found that the length of a 
sentence was a matter for the legislatures to decide.56  Rummel claimed 
that the absence of violence in his crimes should militate against the 
imposition of such a severe sentence, but the Court rejected this 
proposition.57  Rummel would have received more lenient sentences in 
almost every other state; however, the differences in the laws of other 
States are minimal.58  In addition, a comparison and determination of 
whether the sentence is disproportionate fails to take into account Texas’ 
liberal parole policy.59  Even if the sentence imposed on Rummel was 
the most severe sentence found in any of the states, this does not 
 
 51. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 265.  In 1964, Rummel pled guilty to obtaining $80 worth of goods 
through fraudulent use of a credit card.  Id.  This was felony theft and Rummel was sentenced to 
three years in the state penitentiary.  Id.  In 1969, Rummel pled guilty to passing a forged check in 
the amount of $28.36.  Id. at 265-266.  This offense was punishable by two to five years 
imprisonment.  Id.  Rummel was sentenced to four years in the state penitentiary.  Id. at 266. 
 52. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 266.  A recidivist is defined as “[o]ne who has been convicted of 
multiple criminal offenses, usually similar in nature.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1276 (7th ed. 
1999). 
 53. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 266. 
 54. Id.  Texas’ recidivist statute required a mandatory life sentence with the possibility of 
parole in the state penitentiary for anyone convicted of a felony that had been convicted of two prior 
felonies, but only if each prior felony conviction resulted in a prison sentence.  Id. at 278. 
 55. Id. at 267.  Rummel claimed his sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate as 
against the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.  Id. 
 56. Id. at 274.  “[A]ny ‘nationwide trend’ toward lighter, discretionary sentences must find its 
source and its sustaining force in the legislatures, not in the federal courts.”  Rummel, 445 U.S. at 
284. 
 57. Id. at 275.  Society still has an interest in punishing and deterring a particular crime by 
punishing it severely even though it lacked violence.  Id.  High corporate officials can commit the 
serious crimes of bribery or anti-trust violations or violations of environmental standards which are 
not violent offenses, but still serious.  Id. 
 58. Id. at 279.  This excludes Texas, West Virginia, and Washington.  Id.  However, in some 
states, such as Colorado, Nevada, and Wyoming, life sentences are triggered by four felonies, not 
three.  Rummel, 445 U.S. at 279-80.  Some states, such as Mississippi, require a violent felony 
conviction before imposing a life sentence.  Id.  Other states, such as Washington D.C., Idaho, and 
Oklahoma, leave the sentencing decision within the discretion of the judge.  Id. 
 59. Id.  The liberal policy of granting good time credits to prisoners usually allows a prisoner 
to become eligible for parole in twelve years.  Id.  Because Rummel has no right to parole, his 
sentence cannot be treated as a sentence of only twelve years.  Id.  However, this liberal policy 
cannot be ignored when determining if Rummel’s sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate.  
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 280-81.  Possibility of parole distinguishes Rummel from a person sentenced 
in Mississippi, which provides for a sentence without parole on the third strike.  Id. at 281. 
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necessarily make Rummel’s sentence grossly disproportionate to his 
offenses.60  Each state legislature is entitled to make its own judgments 
on what sentences should be imposed for different crimes.61  Therefore, 
the Court affirmed Rummel’s sentence.62 
Justices Powell, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented.63  First, 
the dissent believed that “the penalty for a noncapital offense may be 
unconstitutionally disproportionate.”64  Second, “the possibility of parole 
should not be considered in assessing the nature of the punishment.”65 
Third, “a mandatory life sentence is grossly disproportionate as applied 
to petitioner.”66  Fourth, “the conclusion that this petitioner has suffered 
 
 60. Id.  Absent national uniformity, which is against the notion of federalism, one State will 
always be the one to treat offenders the harshest.  Id. at 282.  For example, California considers the 
theft of avocados or citrus fruit as particularly repugnant; in some States, such as Idaho, theft of 
$100 is punishable by a fine, in another State, such as Nevada, it could be punishable by 10 years in 
prison.  Id. 
 61. Id. at 284.  The legislature’s determination of what sentence to impose for particular 
crimes is only confined by the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishments which “can be informed by objective factors.”  Rummel, 445 U.S. at 284.  The purpose 
of recidivist statutes is to deter repeat offenders and to segregate a person who commits criminal 
offenses repeatedly from the rest of society.  Id. 
 62. Id. at 285. 
 63. Id. at 285 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 64. Id. at 286.  Disproportionality analysis focuses on whether a person deserves the 
punishment meted out, not whether the punishment serves some societal goal.  Id. at 288.  The 
principle of disproportionality comes from English law.  Rummel, 445 U.S. at 288 (Powell, J., 
dissenting).  The Magna Carta of 1215 insured that an offense should be fined according to the 
gravity of the crime.  Id. at 288-89.  By 1400, common law agreed “that punishment should not be 
excessive either in severity or length.”  Id. at 289.  The “cruel and unusual punishments clause of 
the English Bill of Rights of 1689” was a “reiteration of the English policy against disproportionate 
penalties.”  Id. at  289.  In Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), the defendant was 
convicted of falsifying a public record and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment with chains, the loss 
of his civil rights, and perpetual surveillance.  Id.  The Court found the punishment was cruel and 
unusual.  Id.  The Court based its decision, in part, on “the relationship between the crime 
committed and the punishment imposed.”  Rummel, 445 U.S. at 289-90 (Powell, J., dissenting).  The 
Court found that Weems “had been punished more severely than persons in the same jurisdiction 
who committed more serious crimes, or persons who committed a similar crime in other American 
jurisdictions.”  Id. at 290. 
 65. Id. at 286.  Notably, Rummel has no right to parole, it is simply an act of executive grace.  
Id. at 293.  To hold that a sentence is not cruel and unusual nor grossly disproportionate because 
parole is probable, is cruel itself because a prisoner “cannot enforce that expectation.”  Id. at 294.  A 
Court has never refused to examine an Eighth Amendment claim because a prisoner might be 
pardoned.  Id.  “In June 1979, the Governor of Texas refused to grant parole to 79% of the state 
prisoners whom the parole board recommended for release.”  Rummel, 445 U.S. at 294 (Powell, J., 
dissenting). 
 66. Id. at 286.  Objective factors should be used to determine whether a sentence is grossly 
disproportionate.  Id. at 295.  “Among these are (i) the nature of the offense; (ii) the sentence 
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions; and (iii) the sentence imposed 
upon other criminals in the same jurisdiction.”  Id. (citations omitted).  All of Rummel’s crimes 
involved small amounts of money and none of them involved actual violence, the threat of violence, 
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a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights is compatible with principles 
of judicial restraint and federalism.”67 
2.  Solem v. Helm68 
Helm was convicted by South Dakota of six non-violent felonies69 
and, in 1979, he pled guilty of uttering a “no account” check in the 
 
or injury to persons.  Id.  Since Rummel’s conviction, Texas has reclassified his third offense as a 
misdemeanor.  Id.  “[O]nly 12 States have ever enacted habitual offender statutes imposing a 
mandatory life sentence for the commission of two or three nonviolent felonies.”  Rummel, 445 U.S. 
at 296 (Powell, J., dissenting).  “[O]nly 3 States, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia have 
retained such a statute.”  Id.  Therefore, three-fourths of the States that had this scheme have 
decided that it does not work.  Id. at 296-97.  “Kentucky . . . replaced the mandatory life sentence 
with a more flexible scheme ‘because of a judgment that under some circumstances life 
imprisonment for a habitual criminal is not justified.’”  Id. at 297.  “Kansas abolished its statute 
mandating a life sentence for the commission of three felonies after a state legislative commission 
concluded that the legislative policy as expressed in the habitual criminal law bears no particular 
resemblance to the enforcement policy of prosecutors and judges.”  Id.  Washington retains the 
Texas scheme, but “the State Supreme Court has suggested that application of its statute to persons 
like the petitioner might constitute cruel and unusual punishment.”  Id. at 297-98.  “More than three-
quarters of American jurisdictions have never adopted a habitual offender statute that would commit 
the petitioner to mandatory life imprisonment.”  Rummel, 445 U.S. at 298 (Powell, J., dissenting).  
“The jurisdictions that currently employ habitual offender statutes either (i) require the commission 
of more than three offenses, (ii) require the commission of at least one violent crime, (iii) limit a 
mandatory penalty to less than life, or (iv) grant discretion to the sentencing authority.”  Id. at 298 
(footnotes omitted).  No jurisdiction would require a mandatory life sentence for the commission of 
three nonviolent property-related offenses.  Id.  Congress also has not adopted a scheme like Texas’ 
statute.  Id. at 300.  The federal habitual offender statute only requires increased sentences for 
“‘dangerous special offender’ [sic] who have been convicted of a felony.”  Id. at 299.  In order to be 
a “dangerous special offender” a felon must have committed at least two previous felonies.  Id.  One 
of the prior felonies must have been committed in the last five years.  Rummel, 445 U.S. at 299 
(Powell, J., dissenting).  The maximum sentence is not to exceed 25 years and should not be 
disproportionate to the maximum sentence otherwise authorized for such a felony.  Id.  Texas’ 
scheme mandates that a person who is convicted twice of a crime should receive a greater sentence 
than an offender who is only convicted once of that crime.  Id. at 301.  However, the sentence 
received for the twice-conviction of a crime such as the unauthorized use of a vehicle is not greater 
than the sentence received for the twice-conviction of a greater crime such as rape.  Id.  Therefore, 
when two-time offenders are sentenced, the sentence varies with the severity of the offense, but 
three-time felons all receive the same sentence.  Id.  Imposition of the same sentence on offenders 
who commit different crimes raises doubts about the proportionality of the sentence.  Id.  Review of 
the objective factors shows that Rummel’s sentence is grossly disproportionate.  Rummel, 445 U.S. 
at 302 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 67. Id. at 286. 
 68. 463 U.S. 277 (1983) overruled by Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
 69. Id. at 279.  “In 1964, 1966, and 1969 Helm was convicted of third-degree burglary.”  Id.  
In 1972, Helm was found guilty of receiving money under false pretenses.  Id. at 279-80.  In 1973, 
he was found guilty of grand larceny.  Id. at 280.  In 1975, he was convicted of driving while 
intoxicated, his third such offense.  Id.  The only notation in the record regarding these offenses is 
that “they were all non-violent, none was a crime against a person, and alcohol was a contributing 
factor in each case.”  Solem, 463 U.S. at 280. 
10
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amount of $100.70  Because of Helm’s criminal record, he was sentenced 
to life imprisonment under South Dakota’s recidivist statute.71  The 
United States Court of Appeals reversed the sentence because Rummel 
was distinguishable.72  The United States Supreme Court found that the 
“cruel and unusual punishments” clause in the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits “sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.”73  
The principle of proportionality is deeply rooted in common law,74 
however, “outside the context of capital punishment, successful 
challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [will be] 
exceedingly rare.”75  Courts should use objective factors when 
 
 70. Id. at 281, 282.  Helm claims he was working in Sioux Falls when he got his paycheck.  
Id. at 281.  He was drinking and wound up in Rapid City with more money than he had when he left 
Sioux Falls.  Id.  He does not know how he got that money.  Id. 
 71. Id. at 281, 282.  “When a defendant has been convicted of at least three prior convictions 
in addition to the principal felony, the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to the 
sentence for a Class 1 felony.”  Solem, 463 U.S. at 281.  “The maximum penalty for a ‘Class 1 
felony’ was life imprisonment in the state penitentiary and a $25,000 fine.”  Id.  Parole is 
unavailable under this sentencing scheme.  Id. at 282.  Although parole is unavailable under this 
sentencing scheme, the governor is authorized to commute sentences or pardon prisoners.  Id.  
Ordinarily the maximum sentence for Helm’s offense is five years imprisonment in the state 
penitentiary and a $5,000 fine.  Id. at 281. 
 72. Id. at 283.  Helm received a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole, whereas Rummel could have been paroled in as little as twelve years.  Solem, 463 U.S. at 
283.  “The Court of Appeals examined the nature of Helm’s offenses, the nature of his sentence, and 
the sentence he could have received in other States for the same offense” and concluded that Helm’s 
sentence was grossly disproportionate to his offense.  Id. at 284. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.  In 1215, the Magna Carta and the First Statute of Westminster declared that 
“amercements” (fines) are not to be excessive.  Id.  Amercements were payments to the King that 
were imposed against defendants, plaintiffs who failed to follow court rules, and against entire 
townships that did not live up to their obligations, or individuals whom the King felt deserved to be 
penalized.  Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 269 (1989).  
Amercements are not the same as damages.  Id. at 270 n.13.  The Magna Carta placed limits on 
when and who could be amerced and the amount.  Id. at 270.  Most amercements were not large and 
were a form of taxation.  Id. at 271.  Eventually, prison sentences replaced amercements as the 
normal criminal sanctions.  Solem, 463 U.S. at 285.  At this point, the common law recognized that 
they must also be proportional.  Id.  This principle was repeated in the English Bill of Rights which 
was later adopted by the framers of the Eighth Amendment.  Id.  When the framers adopted the 
same language from the English Bill of Rights they also intended to adopt the English 
proportionality principle because it was a theme of the era “that Americans had all the rights of 
English subjects.”  Id. at 285-86.  The Court in Weems, 217 U.S. 349, held that the sentence 
imposed was not cruel only because it involved the use of chains, but also because it was “cruel in 
its excess of imprisonment.”  Id. at 287.  The Constitution is explicit that excessive fines are not 
permitted and cases have decided that a proportionality analysis must be done to determine that a 
death sentence is not excessive.  Id. at 289.  “It would be anomalous . . . if the lesser punishment of 
a fine and the greater punishment of death were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the 
intermediate punishment of imprisonment were not.”  Solem, 463 U.S. at 289. 
 75. Solem, 463 U.S. at 289-90.  Nevertheless, proportionality analysis is applicable to 
noncapital cases because no penalty is per se constitutional.  Id. at 290. 
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conducting a proportionality review.76  The gravity of the offense and 
the harshness of the penalty,77 a comparison of “sentences imposed on 
other criminals in the same jurisdiction,”78 and a comparison of “the 
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other 
jurisdictions”79 are objective factors that should be considered.80  
Rummel is essentially different from the case at bar and, therefore, is not 
dispositive of the issue.81  By applying the objective factors, the court 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 290-91.  Helm’s crime did not involve violence and the amount of the check was 
relatively small.  Id. at 296.  All of his prior felonies were non-violent, relatively minor, and none 
were against another person.  Id. at 296-97.  Barring clemency, Helm will spend the rest of his life 
in prison.  Solem, 463 U.S. at 297.  This is the most severe sentence that can be imposed in South 
Dakota because they do not have the death penalty.  Id. at 297. 
 78. Id. at 291.  “If more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious 
penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at issue may be excessive.”  Id.  The other 
crimes for which a South Dakota court can impose a life sentence are treason, first degree 
manslaughter, murder, first degree arson, and kidnapping.  Id. at 298.  “Attempted murder, placing 
an explosive device on an aircraft, and first degree rape were only Class 2 felonies.”  Id.  
“Aggravated riot was only a Class 3 felony.”  Id. at 298.  “Distribution of heroin and aggravated 
assault were only Class 4 felonies.”  Solem, 463 U.S. at 298.  “[T]he penalty for a second or third 
felony is increased by one class.”  Id.  There is nothing in the record that any recidivist other than 
Helm had ever been sentenced as severely for comparable crimes.  Id. at 299. 
 79. Id.  Only in Nevada could Helm have received a life sentence without the possibility of 
parole for his crime.  Id.  In addition, the sentence is not mandatory in Nevada, it is merely 
authorized.  Id. at 299-300.  No defendant in Nevada who is in the same position as Helm has ever 
actually received this sentence.  Solem, 463 U.S. at 299-300. 
 80. Id. at 290-91.  Judges are competent to compare offenses on a relative scale because these 
are the types of judgments courts have traditionally had to make.  Id. at 292.  “Comparisons can be 
made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, and the culpability of the 
offender.”  Id.  For instance, crimes that involve violence or the threat of violence are more serious 
than non-violent crimes.  Id. at 292-93.  “The absolute magnitude of the crime may be relevant.”  Id. 
at 293.  For example, stealing a million dollars is sentenced more severely than stealing $100 and a 
lesser included offense is punished less severely than the greater offense.  Solem, 463 U.S. at 493.  
Attempts are not as serious as completed crimes.  Id.  An accessory after the fact should receive a 
lesser sentence than the principal.  Id.  Negligence is less serious than intentional conduct.  Id.  A 
review of a defendant’s motive is also important.  Id.  The courts’ ability to compare different 
sentences is troublesome because it requires line-drawing.  Id. at 294.  A 25-year sentence is more 
severe than a 15-year sentence, but it is hard to say one violates the Eighth Amendment and the 
other does not.  Solem, 463 U.S. at 294.  However, this is the type of line-drawing courts have to 
make in other contexts.  Id.  An example of this is the Sixth Amendment, which requires that an 
accused be provided with a speedy trial, but the permissible delay must be determined on a case-by-
case basis.  Id.  Another example is the Sixth Amendment’s requirement of a jury trial.  Id. at 295.  
The Court has drawn a line by determining that the right to a jury trial is only provided where the 
defendant might receive a sentence of six months or more.  Id.  In choosing this standard, the Court 
“relied almost exclusively on the fact that only New York City denied the right to a jury trial for an 
offense punishable by more than six months.”  Id.  This supports the proposition that courts can 
distinguish different sentences from each other and that courts may properly look at other 
jurisdictions in deciding where to draw the line.  Solem, 463 U.S. at 295. 
 81. Id. at 300.  In Rummel, the defendant had the possibility of parole.  See supra note 65.  In 
Solem, the defendant only has the possibility that the governor may commute his sentence.  Solem, 
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held that Helm’s sentence was grossly disproportionate to his offense 
and was, therefore, unconstitutional because it was prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment.82 
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, and O’Connor 
dissented.83  They found that the majority ignored recent precedent.84  
The majority’s holding cannot be reconciled with Rummel, yet the 
majority did not overrule it.85  The Rummel Court rejected the analysis 
used by the majority in this case.86  Legislatures are better equipped to 
balance the differing interests in order to determine what the appropriate 
sentences for different crimes should be.87 
 
463 U.S. at 300.  Commutation is essentially different than parole.  Id.  Parole is a normal 
expectation in the criminal system and is a regular part of the system.  Id.  The law specifies 
standards and procedures for when prisoners should be granted parole and specifies when a prisoner 
is eligible for such.  Id.  To some extent, it is possible to predict when parole will be granted.  Id. at 
301.  Commutation has no such standards.  Id.  A governor may grant clemency at any time and for 
any reason.  Solem, 463 U.S. at 301.  Finally, Texas has a rather liberal parole policy.  Id.  It is much 
more difficult to obtain commutation in South Dakota.  Id. at 302.  It has been over eight years since 
a life sentence has been commuted.  Id.  Even if Helm’s sentence was commuted, he would still 
only be eligible for parole.  Id.  In South Dakota, Helm must serve three-fourths of his sentence 
before he would be eligible for parole.  Id. at 303. 
 82. Solem, 463 U.S. at 303.  Helm received the highest sentence possible for a relatively 
minor offense.  Id.  “He has been treated more harshly than other criminals in the State who have 
committed more serious crimes.”  Id.  “He has been treated more harshly than he would have been 
in any other jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State.”  Id. 
 83. Id. at 304 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 84. Id.  Chief Justice Burger pointed out that the precedent set by Rummel had not been 
followed by the majority.  Solem, 463 U.S. at 304 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 85. Id. at 304.  The Court in Solem held that a life sentence imposed after a seventh felony 
was grossly disproportionate, but held in Rummel that a life sentence imposed after only three prior 
felonies was not grossly disproportionate.  Id.  Comparing Helm’s crimes to Rummel’s makes 
Rummel look like a “model citizen.”  Id.  Helm was convicted of three burglaries and had a third 
conviction for drunk driving.  Id. at 304.  Helm’s crimes posed a real threat to the public, whereas 
Rummel’s did not.  Solem, 463 U.S. at 315-16 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  Helm demonstrated his 
inability to conform to society’s standards far more than Rummel did.  Id. at 316.  The distinction 
between a life sentence without the possibility of parole and one with the possibility of parole does 
not withstand scrutiny.  Id.  A well-behaved prisoner in Helm’s position is not likely to actually 
serve the full life term.  Id.  Since 1964, twenty-two life sentences in South Dakota have been 
commuted to terms of years and twenty-five requests for commutation were denied.  Id. at 316-17. 
 86. Id. at 308.  The Rummel Court refused to draw a line between violent and non-violent 
offenses.  Solem, 463 U.S. at 308 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  The Court also rejected Rummel’s 
attempt to draw a comparison between his sentence and sentences in other States for the same 
offense.  Id.  Such comparisons are flawed because laws are widely varying and “some States have 
comprehension provisions for parole and others do not.”  Id. at 308-09.  “Such comparisons trample 
on fundamental concepts of federalism.”  Id. at 309.  Finally, the Rummel Court rejected an attempt 
to measure Rummel’s sentence against those imposed for other crimes in Texas.  Id.  The sentences 
imposed for different crimes is a matter of legislative discretion.  Id. at 310. 
 87. Solem, 463 U.S. at 314 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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3.  Harmelin v. Michigan88 
Harmelin was convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine and 
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.89  Justice 
Scalia announced the judgment of the Court.90  He also delivered an 
opinion which the Chief Justice joined.91  Justice Scalia concluded by 
looking at old English precedent that the Eighth Amendment did not 
include a proportionality analysis.92  The cruel and unusual punishment 
clause in the American Constitution was meant to be a check upon the 
Legislature.93  According to Scalia, the framers of the Constitution did 
not mean to include proportionality analysis in the Eighth Amendment 
when they included the phrase “cruel and unusual punishments.”94  
 
 88. 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
 89. Id. at 961. 
 90. Id.  The Court affirmed Harmelin’s sentence.  Id. at 994-95. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 965.  The Magna Carta provided that a fine should be proportional to the offense.  
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 967.  When imprisonment became the usual criminal sanction, the 
proportionality principle was continued.  Id.  The drafters of the English Declaration of Rights (Bill 
of Rights) knew of this principle, but chose not to prohibit disproportionate sentences.  Id.  Instead, 
they prohibited “cruell and unusuall Punishments.”  Id.  The preamble to the Declaration of Rights 
referred to the illegality of Chief Justice Jeffreys’ sentences rather than the disporportionality of 
those sentences.  Id. at 969.  “[T]he phrase ‘cruell and unusuall’ is treated as interchangeable with 
‘cruel and illegal.’”  Id. at 973.  The Supreme Court observed that “an earlier draft of the 
[Declaration of Rights] prohibited ‘illegal’ punishments, and that the change ‘appears to be 
inadvertent.’”  Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 974 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 318 (1972) 
(Marshall, J., concurring)).  At that time, “[n]ot all punishments were specified by statute; many 
were determined by the common law.”  Id.  “Departures from the common law were lawful only if 
authorized by statute.”  Id.  “A requirement that punishment not be ‘unusuall’ . . . was primarily a 
requirement that judges pronouncing sentence remain within the bounds of common-law tradition.”  
Id. 
 93. Id. at 975-76.  The English meaning of the “cruel and unusual punishments” clause cannot 
be transplanted to American constitutionalism because “[t]here were no common-law punishments 
in the federal system.”  Id. at 975.  Therefore, the clause must have been meant to prevent the 
Legislature from authorizing particular punishments.  Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 975-76. 
 94. Id. at 977.  Proportionality was not a novel idea at the time the constitution was framed.  
Id.  Many State Constitutions included proportionality provisions.  Id.  “[T]o use the phrase ‘cruel 
and unusual punishment’ to describe a requirement of proportionality would have been an 
exceedingly vague and oblique way of saying what Americans were well accustomed to saying 
more directly.”  Id.  “There is little doubt that those who framed, proposed, and ratified the Bill of 
Rights were aware of such [proportionality] provisions, yet chose not to replicate them.”  Id.  The 
New Hampshire Constitution (adopted 8 years before ratification of the Eighth Amendment) and the 
Ohio Constitution (adopted 12 years after the Eighth Amendment ratification), both contained 
provisions against “cruel and unusual punishments” as well as separate proportionality provisions.  
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 977-78.  Notably, New Hampshire’s provision prohibited against  “cruel or 
unusual” punishment.  Id.  During the debates at the state ratifying conventions only methods of 
punishments were discussed, not proportionality.  Id. at 979.  After the Bill of Rights was proposed, 
Congress “punished forgery of United States securities, ‘run[ning] away with [a] ship or vessel, or 
any goods or merchandise to the value of fifty dollars,’ treason, and murder on the high seas” with 
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There are no clear guidelines for analyzing the proportionality of 
punishments as there are with determining whether modes of 
punishments are “cruel and unusual.”95  Scalia does admit that there is a 
proportionality review in the Eighth Amendment when it comes to the 
death penalty.96  Scalia announced the opinion of the Court holding that 
mandatory sentences are not unconstitutional.97 
Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter concurred in the 
judgment.98  They found that, although the Court’s proportionality 
principles have not been clear, they can be reconciled and stare decisis 
 
the punishment of hanging.  Id. at 980-81.  Yet, there is no indication that anyone considered these 
punishments unconstitutional because they were disproportionate.  Id. at 981.  During the nineteenth 
century many States ratified constitutions that provided for prohibitions against both cruel and 
unusual punishments and disproportionate punishments.  Id. at 982. 
 95. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 985.  A proportionality principle is an invitation to impose 
subjective values.  Id.  This is clear when the three-factor test from Solem is considered.  Id. at 986.  
The gravity of the offense is difficult to measure because of the variation among ages, generations, 
and jurisdictions regarding what offenses are considered serious.  Id. at 987.  Sodomy is punished 
more severely in Massachusetts than assault and battery, while several states do not even punish 
sodomy.  Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS §§ 272:34, 265:13(a) (1988)).  “In Louisiana, one who 
assaults another with a dangerous weapon faces the same maximum prison term as one who 
removes a shopping basket ‘from the parking area or grounds of any store . . . without 
authorization.’”  Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:37, 14:68.1 (West 1986)).  Also, “a battery 
that results in ‘protracted and obvious disfigurement’ merits imprisonment ‘for not more than five 
years,’ one half the maximum penalty for theft of livestock or an oilfield seismograph.”  Harmelin, 
501 U.S. at 987 (cites omitted) (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:34.1, 14:67.1, 14:67.8 (West 
1986)).  Regarding the second factor, if there is no objective standard of gravity, then one cannot 
compare sentences of similar gravity from different jurisdictions.  Id. at 988.  In addition, even if 
crimes could be said to be “similarly grave,” they still could not be compared because there are 
many justifications for differing sentences.  Id.  Crimes that are difficult to detect may require 
higher penalties.  Id. at 989.  Crimes that are not deterred by penalty and crimes that are committed 
once in a lifetime by citizens who will not benefit from rehabilitation may require lower 
punishments.  Id.  The third factor has no relevance to the Eighth Amendment.  Id.  States may 
punish acts that other states reward, for example, killing an endangered animal.  Harmelin, 501 U.S. 
at 989.  States may punish an act more severely that other states are more lenient with or do not 
punish at all.  Id.  Nothing in the Constitution requires states to treat certain offenses in the same 
manner.  Id. at 990.  “The substitution of individual subjective moral values for those of the 
legislature” becomes apparent when the judiciary begins to look at the proportionality of offenses, 
except in non-debatable cases.  Petitioner’s Brief at 18, Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) 
(No. 01-1127).  But see Respondent’s Brief at 30-32, Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (No. 
01-1127) (discussing the subjectivity of not having a proportionality principle).  The legislature 
could impose virtually any sentence it subjectively chose if there was no proportionality review of 
sentences.  Id. at 30.  Therefore, without a proportionality review, there is an invitation to impose 
subjective values of the legislature.  Id. 
 96. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994.  “Death is different.”  Id. 
 97. Id. at 994-95.  “Severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the 
constitutional sense.”  Id. at 994.  In addition, there remains the possibility of executive clemency.  
Id. at 996.  Executive clemency is “the power of the President or a governor to pardon a criminal or 
commute a criminal sentence.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 245 (7th ed. 1999). 
 98. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
15
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requires that they be followed.99  They stated that there are some 
common principles regarding proportionality,100 and by using the 
objective factors, Harmelin’s sentence was not grossly disproportionate 
to his crime.101 
Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented.102  They thought 
it is illogical to presume that the Eighth Amendment would restrict the 
power to fine, but leave the power to imprison wholly unrestrained.103  
Whether or not the framers of the Constitution intended the Eighth 
Amendment to include a proportionality principle with regards to 
sentencing, prior decisions of the Court have found that the principle is 
included.104  The Solem analysis105 should be applied in proportionality 
 
 99. Id.  A proportionality principle had existed for 80 years at the time of this decision (1990).  
Id.  The first case to recognize proportionality was Weems, 217 U.S. 349.  Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 
997.  The case interpreted the Eighth Amendment as prohibiting “greatly disproportioned” 
sentences.  Id. (citing Weems, 217 U.S. at 371). 
 100. Id. at 998.  The first common principle is that the fixing of prison terms is at the discretion 
of legislatures.  Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  The legislatures are best able 
to balance the “sanctity of the individual, the nature of the law, and the relation between law and the 
social order.”  Id.  Legislatures should be granted substantial deference in making these decisions.  
Id. at 999.  The second common principle is that the Eighth Amendment does not require the 
adoption of a single penological theory.  Id.  The third common principle is that large variances in 
sentencing theories and the length of the sentences are inevitable.  Id.  The fourth common principle 
is that objective factors should be used in reviewing the proportionality of sentences.  Id. at 1000.  
The last common principle is that “the Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality 
between crime and sentence.”  Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Only 
extreme, grossly disproportionate, sentences are forbidden.  Id. 
 101. Id. at 1002-05.  Harmelin’s crime was not minor; the amount of cocaine he possessed had 
the potential of yielding 32,500 to 65,000 doses.  Id. at 1002. 
[D]rugs relate to crime in at least three ways: (1) A drug user may commit crime because 
of drug-induced changes in physiological functions, cognitive ability, and mood; (2) A 
drug user may commit crime in order to obtain money to buy drugs; and (3) A violent 
crime may occur as part of the drug business or culture. 
Id.  Since Harmelin’s crime was so serious, no comparative analysis is necessary.  Id. at 1004.  
“[O]ne factor may be sufficient to determine the constitutionality of a particular sentence.”  
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  “[I]ntrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional 
analyses are appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime 
committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.”  Id. 
 102. Id. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting). 
 103. Id. at 1010. 
 104. Id. at 1012.  In Weems, 217 U.S. 349, the Court stated that “the inhibition [of the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause] was directed, not only against punishments which inflict torture, 
‘but against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned 
to the offenses charged.’”  Id. (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 371).  Scalia admits that there is a 
proportionality principle in death penalty cases.  Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1014 (White, J., dissenting).  
He fails to explain why the words “cruel and unusual” contain a proportionality principle for some 
types of cases, but not others.  Id.  In addition, there are limitations to a “purely historical analysis.”  
Id. at 1014.  Time brings changes, therefore, a principle must be capable of “wider application than 
the mischief which gave it birth.”  Id. (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 373).  “This is particularly true 
of constitutions.”  Id. (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 373).  Without a proportionality analysis, there 
16
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review.106  The dissent concluded that application of the Solem factors 
shows that the sentence in this case was grossly disproportionate to the 
crime.107 
Justices Stevens, while joining in Justice White’s dissenting 
opinion, filed a separate dissenting opinion finding that the sentence at 
issue here was grossly disproportionate to the offense.108  Justice 
 
would be “no mechanism for addressing a situation such as that proposed in Rummel, in which a 
legislature makes overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment.”  Id. at 1018.  Scalia 
claims that such an example would be easy to declare disproportional and would, therefore, never 
occur.  Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1018 (White, J., dissenting).  However, “absent a proportionality 
guarantee, there would be no basis for deciding such cases should they arise.”  Id. 
 105. See supra text accompanying notes 70-87 (detailing the Solem analysis). 
 106. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1015 (White, J., dissenting).  This “analysis has worked well in 
practice.”  Id.  “Courts appear to have had little difficulty applying the analysis to a given sentence, 
and application of the test by numerous state and federal appellate courts has resulted in a mere 
handful of sentences being declared unconstitutional.”  Id. at 1015.  It is clear that courts are not 
instituting their own subjective beliefs for those of the legislature.  Id. at 1016.  All the factors from 
Solem should be applied.  Id. at 1019.  The Court in Solem made it clear that “no one factor will be 
dispositive in a given case.”  Id.  Numerous cases have used intrajurisdictional and 
interjurisdictional comparisons of crimes and punishments in making proportionality reviews.  
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1019 (White, J., dissenting).  A court “would have no basis for its 
determination that a sentence was – or was not – disproportionate, other than the ‘subjective views 
of individual [judges]’” if it only looked at the first Solem factor.  Id. at 1020. 
 107. Id. at 1021.  The sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole is the most 
severe possible sentence, since Michigan has no death penalty.  Id. at 1022. 
[I]n evaluating the gravity of the offense, it is appropriate to consider “the harm caused 
or threatened to the victim or society,” based on such things as the degree of violence 
involved in the crime and “[t]he absolute magnitude of the crime,” and “the culpability 
of the offender,” including the degree of requisite intent and the offender’s motive in 
committing the crime. 
Id. (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 292-93).  Possession of drugs mostly affects the possessor.  Id.  The 
ripple effect on society is usually a consequence of addiction and not mere possession.  Harmelin, 
501 U.S. at 1022-23.  “Because possession is necessarily a lesser included offense of possession 
with intent to distribute, it is odd to punish the former as severely as the latter.”  Id. at 1024.  The 
penalty of life in prison without the possibility of parole is reserved for three offenses in Michigan: 
“first-degree murder; manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent to manufacture or 
distribute 650 grams or more of narcotics; and possession of 650 grams or more of narcotics.”  Id. at 
1025-26 (cites omitted).  Second-degree murder and armed robbery do not carry as harsh a penalty 
as the crime at issue here.  Id. at 1026.  Harmelin has been treated as, or more, severely than 
criminals who have committed graver crimes.  Id.   
No other jurisdiction imposes a punishment nearly as severe as Michigan’s for 
possession of the amount of drugs at issue here.  Of the remaining 49 States, only 
Alabama provides for a mandatory sentence of life without parole for a first-time drug 
offender, and then only when a defendant possesses 10 kilograms or more of cocaine. 
Id. 
 108. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1029 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Blackmun similarly agreed 
with Justice White’s dissent while also joining Justice Stevens in his separate opinion.  Id. at 1028.  
The type of sentence at issue here “must rest on a rational determination that the punished ‘criminal 
conduct is so atrocious that society’s interest in deterrence and retribution wholly outweighs any 
considerations of reform or rehabilitation of the perpetrator.’”  Id. (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 
17
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Marshall also separately dissented to restate his opinion that capital 
punishment is always “cruel and unusual.”109  Yet Justice Marshall 
agreed with Justice White’s finding that there is a general proportionality 
requirement in both capital and non-capital cases.110 
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Statement of Facts 
Leandro Andrade is a longtime heroin addict.111  On November 4, 
1995, he stole five videotapes worth $84.70 from a K-Mart store in 
Ontario, California.112  Two weeks later, Andrade stole four videotapes 
worth $68.84 from another K-Mart store in Montclair, California.113  In 
both cases, store personnel stopped Andrade before he left the 
premises.114  Andrade’s heroin addiction prompted these crimes.115 
 
307).  The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, including all relevant enhancements, would have only 
sentenced Harmelin to 10 years.  Id. at 1029.  In most states, the period of imprisonment would be 
substantially shorter.  Id. 
 109. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1027 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  “I adhere to my view that capital 
punishment is in all instances unconstitutional.”  Id. 
 110. Id.  According to Justice Marshall, if the Court properly applied the proportionality 
principle in this case it would have concluded that “mandating life sentences with no possibility of 
parole even for first-time drug possession offenders is unconstitutional” because it is disproportional  
and the Constitution requires sentences to be proportional.  Id. 
 111. Andrade v. Attorney General of California, 270 F.3d 743, 748 (9th Cir. 2001) rev’d, 538 
U.S. 63 (2003).  Andrade’s pre-sentence report indicates that he has been a heroin addict since 
1977.  Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 67 (2003).  Heroin addiction occurs quickly.  NarcOnon, 
Heroin Addiction Treatment, available at http://www.drugaddictiontreatment.info/heroin.htm (last 
visited Sept. 2, 2004).  Addicts need more heroin each time in order to satisfy this addiction.  Id.  
The habit can cost “$100-$200 a day.”  Id.  This “can cause addicts to quickly turn to lives of 
shoplifting, burglary, theft, drug dealing, and prostitution to support their habits.”  Id.  Recent years 
have seen an increase in heroin addiction of 20% mostly due to the fact that it is cheaper, more 
potent, and more is available.  Id.  In California, heroin is “cheap, potent, and plentiful.”  Id.  
Emergency rooms see two to three overdoses each day.  NarcOnon, supra. 
 112. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66. 
 113. Id.  Shoplifting is a problem.  See Monifa Marrero, Heavy Lifting: Shoplifters Under the 
Microscope, UVISION (April 2003), available at http://www.uvi.edu/pub-
relations/u_vision/_private/shoplifting.htm.  The K-mart store in Lockhart Gardens suffered 
$27,000 in losses due to shoplifting from September 2002 to January 2003.  Id.  Of the $31 billion 
in inventory shrinkage, $10 billion resulted from shoplifting.  Id.  Effects of shoplifting go beyond 
the cost to retailers.  Id.  The average family of four will pay an additional $440 this year in higher 
prices.  Id.  In addition, retailers pay $4.8 million a month for prosecution and protection.  Id. 
 114. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66. 
 115. Id. at 67 (stating that Andrade’s pre-sentence report indicates that he stole the videotapes 
in order to support his habit). 
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B.  Procedural History 
1.  The Trial Court 
The kinds of thefts that Andrade committed are normally 
considered minor in California.116  However, petty theft with a prior 
conviction is a “wobbler” offense.117  Andrade was previously convicted 
of several non-violent offenses.118  Because of Andrade’s previous 
conviction for petty theft, the prosecutor charged him with two felonies 
instead of misdemeanors.119  Since Andrade had two prior felonies,120 
the new felonies were charged as his third and fourth strikes under Three 
Strikes.121  The jury found Andrade guilty as charged.122  Andrade was 
sentenced to 50 years to life imprisonment.123 
 
 116. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 749 (discussing that Cal. Penal Code 490 classifies both of these 
offenses as petty thefts subject up to six months in county jail and a $1000 fine). 
 117. Id.  See supra note 41 and accompanying text for the definition of a “wobbler” offense. 
 118. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 748-49.  Andrade was convicted in 1982 of misdemeanor theft and 
drug diversion.  Id.  He served six days in county jail and received twelve months probation.  Id. at 
748.  In 1983, Andrade pled guilty to three counts of first-degree residential burglary.  Id.  He was 
sentenced to 120 months in prison.  Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66.  In 1988, Andrade was convicted of 
felony transportation of marijuana.  Andrade, 270 F.3d at 748-49.  He was sentenced to eight years 
in prison and served less than one and a half years.  Id. at 749.  In 1990, Andrade was convicted of 
petty theft.  Id.  He was sentenced to 180 days in jail.  Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66.  Again in 1990, 
Andrade was convicted of felony transportation of marijuana.  Andrade, 270 F.3d at 749.  He was 
sentenced to six years in prison, but served less than two and a half years.  Id.  In 1991, Andrade 
received parole for escape from a federal prison.  Id. 
 119. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 749. 
 120. Id.  The three 1983 burglary convictions were Andrade’s first two strikes.  Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id.  The trial court denied Andrade’s motions to strike his prior convictions and to reduce 
the charges from felonies to misdemeanors.  Id.  The trial court then bifurcated Andrade’s trial into 
two proceedings; the first one to determine whether he committed the current offenses he was 
charged with, and the second one to determine whether he had any prior convictions that would 
count as prior strikes under Three Strikes.  Andrade, 270 F.3d at 749.  He was found guilty of two 
counts of petty theft with a prior under California Penal Code 666.  Id.  The jury also found that he 
had been convicted of three counts of residential burglary in 1983.  Id. 
 123. Id.  This sentence is made up of two 25 years to life sentences for each of his thefts from 
the two K-Mart stores to be served consecutively.  Id.  Andrade will not be eligible for parole for 50 
years because Three Strikes requires the sentences to be served consecutively.  Id. (citing Cal. Penal 
Code §§ 667(c)(6), 1170.12(a)(6)).  Andrade will be 87 years old before he is eligible for parole in 
2046.  Id. at 750.  After receiving the sentence he stated, “I wasn’t aware that for that little mistake I 
was going to receive a 25-to-life sentence.”  CBS News Stories, Three Strikes (July 9, 2003), at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/10/28/60ll/main527248.shtml.  One of the two forepersons 
on Andrade’s jury, Deborah Freeman, stated that she did not even know what the sentence would be 
until after the court handed it down.  Id.  She stated that it was “ludicrous.”  Id.  The other 
foreperson, Bridget George, was “pretty shocked” at the sentence and declared it “incredibly out of 
this world for me for this particular crime.”  Id.  She stated that “I think it is cruel and unusual 
punishment, 50 to life, for stealing videotapes.”  Id. 
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2.  Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision 
Andrade filed several appeals before the case reached the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.124  The Ninth Circuit granted Andrade a 
certificate of appealability to raise the Eighth Amendment issue.125  The 
court found that Rummel,126 Solem,127 and Harmelin128 were clearly 
established federal law under the AEDPA.129  Gross disproportionality 
analysis requires a comparison to all three cases.130  The court found that 
Andrade’s case was most analogous to Solem and the state court’s 
failure to address that case was clear error and, therefore, an 
unreasonable application of federal law.131  The court also found that 
Andrade’s sentence was grossly disproportionate and a decision to the 
contrary was an unreasonable application of federal law.132  The court 
 
 124. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 750.  The California Court of Appeal affirmed Andrade’s conviction 
and sentence on May 13, 1997.  Id.  The opinion was unpublished, but the court rejected the 
argument that the sentence was cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.  Id.  
The California Supreme Court denied Andrade’s petition for review and made no comments.  Id.  
Andrade filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court.  Id.  The petition was 
denied because “the state court[’s] conclusions . . . were reasonable applications of federal law.”  Id.  
Judgment was entered on February 19, 1999.  Andrade, 270 F.3d at 750.  The district court denied 
Andrade’s certificate of appealability.  Id. 
 125. Id.  The Ninth Circuit also appointed counsel to Andrade, who had initiated his appeal 
proceedings pro se.  Id. 
 126. 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (finding that a sentence of 25 years to life with the possibility of 
parole in twelve years for fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods and services 
was not cruel and unusual punishment).  See supra notes 49-67 and accompanying text for a full 
analysis of this case. 
 127. 463 U.S. 277 (finding that a sentence of 25 years to life without the possibility of parole 
for uttering a “no account” check for $100 was cruel and unusual punishment).  See supra notes 68-
87 and accompanying text for a full analysis of this case. 
 128. 501 U.S. 957 (finding that a sentence of 25 years to life without the possibility of parole 
for possession of 672 grams of cocaine was not cruel and unusual punishment).  See supra notes 88-
110 and accompanying text for a full analysis of this case. 
 129. See Andrade, 270 F.3d at 766. 28 USC § 2254 is the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act, which circumscribes a federal habeas court’s review of a state court decision.  Lockyer, 
538 U.S. at 70. 
 130. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 766. 
 131. Id. at 766-67.  Even though Andrade’s criminal history is close to the defendant’s in both 
Rummel and Solem, his life sentence with parole in 50 years is most analogous to the Solem 
defendant’s life without the possibility of parole as compared to the Rummel defendant’s life with 
the possibility of parole in 12 years.  Id. at 765.  See also Respondent’s Brief at 17, Lockyer v. 
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (No. 01-1127) (discussing why Harmelin is distinguishable from the 
present case). 
 132. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 767.  The court applied the Solem test.  Id. at 758.  First, the court 
found that the sentence was harsh.  Id. at 758-59.  It was the second most severe sentence available.  
Id. at 759. Andrade would not be eligible for parole until he was 87 years old, yet the average life 
expectancy of a man was 77 years.  Id.  It was likely that Andrade would spend the rest of his life in 
prison.  Id.  However, where would this line of reasoning stop?  Petitioner’s Brief at 19, Lockyer v. 
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (No. 01-1127).  What if Andrade had been 20 years old at the time of 
20
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reversed the judgment of the district court.133 
C.  United States Supreme Court Decision 
1.  The Majority Opinion 
In 2002, the Supreme Court granted California Attorney General 
 
sentencing, what if the statistics on life expectancy change, or should health problems be included in 
the calculation?  Id.  No matter how minimal the possibility of parole for Andrade was, it still 
existed, and therefore Andrade’s sentence was not the same as life without the possibility of parole.  
Id.  But see Respondent’s Brief at 17, Lockyer (No. 01-1127) (discussing how a fifty years to life 
sentence is the equivalent of a life sentence without the possibility of parole).  See also 21A AM. 
JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 954 (2003) (discussing how age is a factor that can be considered in 
determining whether a sentence is proportional to the crime).  Second, the court found that the 
triggering offense was not that grave.  Andrade, 270 F.3d at 759.  It was for a small amount of 
money and did not involve violence.  Id.  Petty theft of this kind is normally a misdemeanor.  Id.  
Andrade’s prior strike felonies were more than a decade earlier and adjudicated in one proceeding.  
Id. at 760.  Comparing the severity of the sentence with the gravity of the offense, the court found 
an inference of gross disproportionality.  Id. at 761.  However, the petitioner argued that the absence 
of violence or looking at the value of what was taken should not minimize the offense.  Petitioner’s 
Brief at 12, Lockyer (No. 01-1127).  The element of recidivism should play a larger role in 
determining the severity of the offense.  Id.  Society could have an interest in deterring offenses that 
do not involve violence.  Id. at 13.  Californians’ judgment about which offenses should receive 
particular sentences should be given deference.  Id.  But see Respondent’s Brief at 30, Lockyer (No. 
01-1127) (discussing how no state should have unlimited discretion in determining sentences).  
Performing an intrajurisdictional comparison, the court found that Andrade’s sentence was only 
exceeded by first-degree murder and a few violent felonies, such as kidnapping, train wrecking, or 
unlawful explosion resulting in death or great bodily injury, but most violent crimes are punished 
less severely.  Andrade, 270 F.3d at 761-62.  Andrade’s sentence was twice as long as any of the 
sentences for recidivists cited by the state.  Id. at 762.  See also Respondent’s Brief at 19, Lockyer 
(No. 01-1127) (discussing how grossly disproportionate Andrade’s sentence was when compared 
with other sentences in the same jurisdiction).  However, “Andrade’s sentence is twice as long as 
other three-strikes defendants because he committed twice as many offenses.”  Petitioner’s Brief at 
19, Lockyer (No. 01-1127).  Finally, the court performed an interjurisdictional comparison.  
Andrade, 270 F.3d at 762.  There are only four other states with recidivist statutes which Andrade’s 
offense would qualify for sentencing under: Rhode Island, West Virginia, Texas, and Louisiana.  Id. 
at 763.  However, Andrade would not have received as severe a sentence in any of those 
jurisdictions.  Id.  See also Respondent’s Brief at 20-21, Lockyer (No. 01-1127) (discussing how 
Andrade’s sentence compares with other sentences for the same crime in different jurisdictions).  
See supra note 43 for the definition of a recidivist statute.  Petitioner disagrees with any 
interjurisdictional analysis because without uniform national guidelines some state will always have 
to be the most severe.  Petitioner’s Brief at 22, Lockyer (No. 01-1127).  But see Respondent’s Brief 
at 22, Lockyer (No. 01-1127) (discussing how, in other contexts, the Supreme Court has looked at a 
consensus of the states regarding punishments to determine whether a punishment was grossly 
disproportionate).  Petitioner also argues that there can be no proportionality review for term of 
years sentences because there are no objective factors to apply to “sentences of different lengths.”  
Petitioner’s Brief at 19, Lockyer (No. 01-1127). 
 133. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 767.  The writ of habeas corpus is to be issued if the state has not 
resentenced Andrade within 60 days of the issuance of this mandate.  Id. 
21
Donham: Lockyer v. Andrade
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005
DONHAM1.DOC 3/7/2005  11:09 AM 
390 AKRON LAW REVIEW [38:369 
Bill Lockyer’s134 petition for a writ of certiorari.135  The Court undertook 
the issue of whether the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals violated the 
AEDPA136 by reversing Andrade’s conviction.137  The first matter the 
Court addressed was identifying the clearly established federal law of 
the Supreme Court.138  The only clearly established federal law is the 
gross disproportionality principle in the Eighth Amendment and its 
applicability to terms of years sentences.139  After making this 
determination, the Court turned to the main thrust of its decision in 
deciding whether the California Court of Appeal’s affirmation of the 
sentence140 was “contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of” 
the clearly established principle of gross proportionately.141  A writ of 
habeas corpus142 was not appropriate in this case because the California 
Court of Appeal’s decision was not “‘contrary to’ the governing legal 
principles.”143  The Court also did not find that the California Court of 
 
 134. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 63.  Bill Lockyer served in the state Legislature before becoming 
California’s Attorney General in 1999.  Office of the Attorney General, at 
http://ag.ca.gov/ag/lockyer.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).  He played an important role in passing 
“hundreds” of toughened criminal laws.  Id. 
 135. Lockyer v. Andrade, 535 U.S. 969 (2002) (granting a petition for writ of certiorari). 
 136. 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  The AEDPA “circumscribes a federal habeas court’s review of a state-
court decision.”  Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003). 
 137. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70.  This Court decided whether the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
erred in finding that Andrade’s sentence of 50 years to life in prison was “contrary to, or an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law” according to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  
Id. at 66.  The Court chose not to reach the issue of whether the state court erred in imposing two 
consecutive 25 years to life prison sentences under Three Strikes.  Id. at 71.  The Court decided 
whether Andrade could obtain habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) on his Eighth Amendment 
claim.  Id. 
 138. Id.  A petition for habeas corpus can only be granted if a court’s decision is “contrary to” 
or “an unreasonable application of” clearly established federal law.  Id. at 73.  The state contends 
that gross disproportionality is not clearly defined.  Petitioner’s Brief, Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 
63 (2003) (No. 01-1127). 
 139. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73.  Supreme Court cases have not established a set of clear factors 
to determine gross disproportionality.  Id.  In Solem, the Court stated that a fifteen-year sentence is 
harsher than a twenty-five year sentence, but it would be difficult to say one violates the Eighth 
Amendment while the other does not.  Id.  In Harmelin, the Court stated that Solem was unclear and 
the proportionality decisions have not been clear or consistent.  Id.  Justices Kennedy and Scalia 
repeatedly stated in Harmelin that Solem was unclear and that there have been no clear and 
consistent proportionality decisions set down by the Supreme Court.  Id.  Therefore, the contours of 
gross disproportionality are unclear and the principle is “applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ 
and ‘extreme’ case.”  Id. 
 140. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66.  The California Court of Appeal affirmed Andrade’s sentence of 
two 25 years to life in prison terms to be served consecutively for a “third strike” conviction.  Id. 
 141. Id. at 73. 
 142. See supra note 26 for definition of a writ of habeas corpus. 
 143. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73-4.  A decision is “contrary to” federal law “‘if the state court 
applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if the state 
court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme 
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Appeal’s decision was an “unreasonable application of” federal law.144  
The Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.145 
2.  The Dissent146 
The dissent agrees with the majority that gross disproportionality is 
part of the Eighth Amendment.147  The dissent also agrees that the term 
“gross disproportion” is so general as to provide state courts with 
considerable leeway in determining gross disproportionality.148 
Nonetheless, the disproportionality review by the state court was 
erroneous and unreasonable for two reasons.149  First, Solem is 
controlling150 because the facts here are on-point with those in Solem.151  
 
Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.”  Id. at 73 (quoting 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06).  See also Bell, 535 U.S. at 694.  It was not contrary to the law for the 
California Court of Appeals to rely on Rummel in making its decision.  Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73.  
Harmelin and Solem specifically state that they did not overrule Rummel.  Id.  In addition, the state 
court was not presented with facts materially indistinguishable from this case.  Id. at 74.  Therefore, 
the state court could not have “arrived at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.”  Id.  
Andrade’s sentence falls between the sentences in Rummel and Solem and, therefore, is not 
materially indistinguishable from either.  Id.  Andrade has the possibility of parole and the 
defendant in Solem did not.  Id.  But see Respondent’s Brief at 17-18, Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 
63 (2003) (No. 01-1127) (discussing how parole in 50 years is equivalent to no parole at all).  
However, Andrade is eligible for parole in 50 years whereas Rummel is eligible in 12 years.  
Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 74. 
 144. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 76.  A state court unreasonably applies federal law if the state court 
correctly states the governing principle, but its application of that principle to the facts of the case is 
objectively unreasonable.  Id. at 75 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 413).  This is not the same as the 
decision being clear error.  Id.  “It is not enough that a federal habeas court, in its ‘independent 
review of the legal question’ is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous’”  Id. 
(quoting Andrade, 270 F.3d at 753).  Legislatures have broad discretion under the governing legal 
principle when making a sentence that fits within the proportionality scope.  Id. at 76 (citing 
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1011).  It was not objectively unreasonable for the Court of Appeals to 
believe that Andrade’s sentence fit within the unclear contours of the proportionality principle.  Id. 
 145. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 77. 
 146. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).  Justice Souter was joined in his dissent by Justice Stevens, 
Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer.  Id. 
 147. Id.  It is “clearly established” that the Eighth Amendment’s exclusion of cruel and unusual 
punishments applies to terms of years sentences, and sentences that are “grossly disproportionate to 
the offense” are unconstitutional.  Id. 
 148. Id. at 77-8. 
 149. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 78 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 150. Id.  Solem is important because it is the Supreme Court’s most recent review of the gross 
disproportionality of a recidivist’s sentence and Harmelin established its authority.  Id.  The case 
also established a benchmark in applying the gross disproportionality principle.  Id.  Life in prison 
for uttering a $100 no account check was grossly disproportionate regardless of the defendant’s six 
previous non-violent felonies.  Id. 
 151. Id.  Andrade and the defendant in Solem (Helm) are both recidivists whose triggering 
offense was theft of minimal value.  Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 78 (Souter, J., dissenting).  Their criminal 
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Since the cases’ facts are the same, the decisions should be the same.152  
Second, the policy behind Three Strikes153 cannot support the imposition 
of a 25-year-to-life sentence for a second minor felony committed soon 
after the triggering offense.154 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  There is a Gross Disproportionality Principle in the Eighth 
Amendment 
Traditionally, proportionality has been a principle in determining 
punishments.155  It was included in the Magna Carta, the First Statute of 
Westminster, and the English Bill of Rights.156  This tradition 
 
backgrounds are comparable, including burglary (although Andrade’s was residential whereas 
Helm’s was not) and no history of violence or crimes against persons.  Id.  The sentences are also 
similar.  Id.  Even though Andrade’s sentence is supposed to be two different sentences it can only 
be understood as one.  Id.  The thefts were separated by only two weeks, the victim was the same 
person, they were both committed for the same reason (to finance a heroin addiction), both offenses 
were charged in one indictment, and the state court spoke of the sentences as one, stating that the 
sentence carried a 50-year minimum.  Id.  Because of the 50-year minimum and the fact that 
Andrade was 37 years old when sentenced, his sentence is the equivalent of a life without parole 
sentence, the same as the sentence in Solem.  Id. at 79. 
 152. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 79 (Souter, J., dissenting).  The only way to reach a different 
sentence is to either deny that parole eligibility after 50 years is not equivalent to having no 
possibility of parole or to ignore Solem as authority.  Id.  A man released after 50 years would have 
no real life left even if he was granted parole and survived to see it.  Id.  “Prison environments are 
themselves potentially damaging situations [that have] negative psychological effects.”  Craig 
Haney, Psychology and the Limits to Prison Pain: Confronting the Coming Crisis in Eighth 
Amendment Law, 3 PSYCHOL. PUBL. POL’Y & L. 499, 504 (1997).  Long prison sentences serve to 
increase crime.  Id.  Solem has never been overruled and discounting it is wrong as a matter of law.  
Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 79 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 153. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 80.  The policy behind the Three Strikes law is deterrence and 
incapacitation to protect the safety of the public.  Id. 
 154. Id. at 79-80.  Andrade did not become twice as dangerous because he stole five more 
videotapes.  Id. at 82.  Because the defendant’s condition did not change between the commission of 
the two offenses, the sentence cannot be doubled without violating the gross disproportionality 
principle in the Eighth Amendment.  Id. at 81-2.  The second theft did not render Andrade so 
dangerous that after 25 years (the date he would be eligible for parole after the first sentence) he 
would need to be incarcerated for another 25 years.  Id. at 82.  There is no other jurisdiction that 
would double a sentence merely because two related thefts took place on separate occasions.  
Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 82 (Souter, J., dissenting).  See text accompanying supra note 42 for the 
definition of a triggering offense. 
 155. Solem, 463 U.S. at 284. 
 156. Id. at 285.  The Magna Carta stated that excessive amercements (fines) were not 
permitted.  Id. at 284.  The common law also recognized that prison sentences should be 
proportional since they had become normal criminal sanctions.  Id. at 285.  The English Bill of 
Rights, the language of which was later adopted in the Eighth Amendment, stated that “excessive 
Baile ought not to be required nor excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments 
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contributed to the United States Constitution’s Framers’ intent when 
they drafted the Eighth Amendment.157  Because the English Bill of 
Rights contained a proportionality principle, when the Framers adopted 
its language they also adopted this principle.158  However, some 
commentators have questioned whether the English Bill of Rights 
actually contained a proportionality principle with regards to 
punishments.159  The traditional approach is that only “torture and 
barbarous punishments” were prohibited based on the Bloody Assizes.160  
 
inflicted.”  Id. 
 157. Id. at 285-86. 
 158. Solem, 463 U.S. at 285-86.  “One of the consistent themes of the era was that Americans 
had all the rights of English subjects.”  Id. at 286.  See also Chris Baniszewski, Comment, Supreme 
Court Review of Excessive Prison Sentences: The Eighth Amendment’s Proportionality 
Requirement, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 929, 934-35 (1993) (discussing the history of the Eighth 
Amendment); Joel E. Hunter, Note, State v. Bonner: In Search of an Objective Eighth Amendment 
Analysis for “Cruel and Unusual Punishment” in South Dakota, 44 S.D. L. REV. 399, 399-400 
(1999) (discussing how the drafters intended to include proportionality review in the Eighth 
Amendment).  “Under the English system, both fines and sentences were required to be 
proportionate to the crime committed, and were therefore not solely limited to the ‘mode’ of 
punishment inflicted.”  Id. at 407.  The Bill of Rights was drafted to ensure that these rights were 
protected.  Solem, 463 U.S. at 286.  But see supra note 96 (Justice Scalia’s opinion in Harmelin 
discussing that the English Declaration of Rights did not include a proportionality principle).  Even 
if the Framers intended the Eighth Amendment to protect more than the English Bill of Rights, the 
fact that the Framers used the same language shows their intent to provide the same minimum level 
of protection already provided to Englishmen.  Solem, 463 U.S. at 286.  See also Stephanie E. 
Carlson, State v. Pack: Proportionality of Sentences – Should It Be a Necessary Factor in 
Determining Whether a Sentence “Shocks the Conscience of the Court?” 40 S.D. L. REV. 130, 141 
(1995) (discussing that the Eighth Amendment includes a proportionality principle because it was 
included in the language of the English Bill of Rights which the framer’s adopted); Barry L. 
Johnson, Purging the Cruel and Unusual: The Autonomous Excessive Fines Clause and Desert-
Based Constitutional Limits on Forfeiture After United States v. Bajakajian, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 
461, 501 (2000) (discussing the same). 
 159. Baniszewski, supra note 158 (discussing the history of the Eighth Amendment).  But see 
Peter Mathis Spett, Note, Confounding the Gradations of Iniquity: An Analysis of Eighth 
Amendment Jurisprudence Set Forth in Harmelin v. Michigan, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203, 
205 (1992/1993) (discussing that the framers may have had a different meaning of cruel and unusual 
in mind other than to prevent excessive punishments). 
 160. Baniszewski, supra note 158, at 931.  The “Bloody Assizes” refers to the Duke of 
Monmouth and his compatriots’ trials for treason.  Id.  The Duke of Monmouth’s uncle inherited the 
throne of England, and apparently the Duke was not happy about this.  Id.  He invaded England but 
was defeated and executed.  Id.  A special commission was created in order to put the Duke’s 
supporters on trial.  Id.  The guilty were executed in the traditional method for traitors, “drawing the 
man on a cart to the gallows where he was hanged by the neck, cut down while still alive, 
disemboweled and his bowels burnt before him, then beheaded and quartered.”  Id.  A few years 
later, William took the throne and the English Declaration of Rights was written in response to the 
public outrage over the executions.  Baniszewski, supra note 158, at 931-32.  Therefore, this 
document was “meant to prohibit torture and barbarous methods of punishments.”  Id. at 932.  See 
also Aisha Ginwalla, Proportionality and the Eighth Amendment: And Their Object Not “Sublime, 
To Make the Punishment Fit the Crime,” 57 MO. L. REV. 607, 610 (1992) (discussing that one 
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However, the meaning of cruel and unusual has evolved into more than 
just physical torture.161  A more recent approach suggests that the 
English Bill of Rights was a response to the Titus Oates trial in 1685.162  
Proponents of this approach believe that the dissenting opinion in Oates’ 
appeal shows the English Bill of Rights did include a proportionality 
principle.163  Another argument is that, given the framer’s interest in 
Enlightenment thinking, it is to be expected that they would adopt a 
proportionality principle.164  Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in 
Harmelin argued that the evidence of the day proved that the drafters did 
not intend to include a proportionality principle in the Eighth 
Amendment.165  However, any evidence that the drafters did not intend 
 
argument was that the framers intended to prevent torturous and barbarous punishments). 
 161. United States v. White, 54 M.J. 469, 474 (C.A.A.F. 2001).  “[T]he current standard is that 
the Eighth Amendment prohibits ‘punishments which are incompatible with the evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,’ . . . or which ‘involve the unnecessary and 
wanton infliction of pain[.]’”  Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976)). 
 162. Baniszewski, supra note 158, at 932.  Since the types of punishments used during the 
“Bloody Assizes” were common for that time period, they cannot be the basis for the Rights that 
were adopted.  Id.  The Oates trial is the “only recorded use of the clause contemporaneous with its 
drafting.”  Id.  Oates perjured himself by falsely accusing several Catholics of plotting the 
assassination of the King, resulting in their executions.  Id. at 932-33.  Since perjurers could no 
longer be sentenced to death, the judge sentenced Oates to “a fine of 2,000 marks, life 
imprisonment, pillorying four times a year, and whippings from Aldgate to Newgate and two days 
later from Newgate to Tyburn.”  Id. at 933.  The judge also removed Oates’ Canonical Habits.  Id.  
The House of Lords affirmed Oates sentence, but the recent approach focuses on the dissent.  
Baniszewski, supra note 158, at 933. 
 163. Id.  The dissent stated that the punishments were “barbarous, inhuman, and unchristian; 
and there is no Precedent to warrant the Punishments of whipping and committing to Prison for 
Life, for the Crime of Perjury; which yet were but Part of the Punishments inflicted upon him.”  Id.  
They concluded that the “Judgments were contrary to Law and ancient Practice, and therefore 
erroneous.”  Id. at 934.  The House of Commons reversed Oates’ sentence as unauthorized.  Stephen 
T. Parr, Symmetric Proportionality: A New Perspective on the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause, 68 TENN. L. REV. 41, 44 (2000). 
 164. Ginwalla, supra note 160, at 610. 
 165. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1011.  Justice Scalia concluded that since the Framers had 
examples of multiple state constitutions to choose from, which contained specific proportionality 
requirements and chose not to use the same language, they did not intend to include a 
proportionality principle in the Eighth Amendment.  Mary K. Woodburn, Note, Harmelin v. 
Michigan and Proportionality Review Under the Eighth Amendment, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1927, 1936 
(1992).  “Both the New Hampshire Constitution, adopted 8 years before ratification of the Eighth 
Amendment, and the Ohio Constitution, adopted 12 years after, contain, in separate provisions, a 
prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ and a requirement that ‘all penalties ought to be 
proportioned to the nature of the offence.’”  Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 977-78.  See also Margaret P. 
Spencer, The Sentencing Controversy: Punishment and Policy in the War Against Drugs: 
Sentencing Drug Offenders: The Incarceration Addiction, 40 VILL. L. REV. 335, 360 (1995) (stating 
the same); Johnson, supra note 158, at 502-03 (stating the same).  Only certain modes of 
punishment were prohibited by the English Bill of Rights.  See Spencer, supra.  However, this 
argument fails to realize that the Court gave the Eighth Amendment an “evolving meaning.”  Id. at 
361. 
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to include a proportionality principle in the Constitution is still 
insufficient to overcome “the reach of the words that otherwise could 
reasonably be construed to include it.”166 
For almost a century, the principle of proportionality has been 
recognized in this country.167  The majority of the Justices have found a 
proportionality principle within the Eighth Amendment.168  The first 
case in the United States to find a proportionality principle was Weems 
v. United States.169  The court found that “[T]he inhibition [of the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause] was directed, not only against 
punishments which inflict torture, ‘but against all punishments which by 
their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the 
offenses charged.’”170 
The text of the Eighth Amendment itself evidences a 
proportionality principle.171  It states that fines and bails are not to be 
 
 166. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1011 (White, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia failed to account for the 
fact that “constitutional language is often ‘boilerplate.’”  Woodburn, supra note 165, at 1936-37.  In 
addition, the States likely interpreted the broad language in the Eighth Amendment to encompass 
the language in their constitutions.  Id. at 1937.  This is supported by the fact that there was little 
protest during the conventions.  Id.  In all likelihood, States would have protested if they believed 
the United States Constitution was significantly different from their own constitutions.  Id.  Since 
the Eighth Amendment contains such general language, the Framers intended future generations to 
define the clause since the “meaning of a constitutional provision can change over time” and 
“situations may arise which the Framers never could have contemplated.”  Id. 
 167. Solem, 463 U.S. at 286.  The first case to find a proportionality principle was decided in 
1910.  Id. at 287.  See also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding that, under 
the principle of stare decisis, a proportionality principle has existed for 80 years). 
 168. Hunter, supra note 158, at 407-08.  See also Parr, supra note 163, at 41 (discussing the 
same); Rachel A. Van Cleave, “Death is Different,” Is Money Different? Criminal Punishments, 
Forfeitures, and Punitive Damages - Shifting Constitutional Paradigms for Assessing 
Proportionality, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 217, 224-25 (2003) (discussing that at least six current 
Supreme Court Justices agree that the Eighth Amendment contains a proportionality principle); 
Michael J. O’Connor, Note, What Would Darwin Say?: The Mis-Evolution of the Eighth 
Amendment, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1389, 1400 (2003) (discussing the same).  A sentence may 
violate the Eighth Amendment if it is not proportionate to the crime that resulted in the defendant’s 
conviction.  Esparza v. Lockyer, No. C 99-3781 CRB (PR), 2001 WL 1528384, *10 (N.D. Cal.) 
(finding that two 25 years to life sentences for drunk driving was not disproportionate).  See also 
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20 (finding that proportionality between sentences and crimes has been 
constitutionally recognized for almost one hundred years in the United States); Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (finding that excessive sanctions are prohibited by the Eighth 
Amendment); Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S 782, 788 (1982) (finding that the Eight Amendment’s 
cruel and unusual punishment clause includes a disproportionality principle); Carmona v. Ward, 439 
U.S. 1091, 1093-94 (1979) (finding that proportionality between a crime and its punishment is a 
firmly rooted principle). 
 169. 217 U.S. 349 (finding that the Eighth Amendment includes a proportionality principle and 
a comparative analysis should be used to determine whether a sentence is disproportionate). 
 170. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1012 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 171. Solem, 463 U.S. at 289. 
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excessive.172  This implies that punishments are not to be excessive 
either.173  As Justice White has stated, “[i]n cases where the courts have 
a discretionary power to fine and imprison, shall it be supposed, that the 
power to fine is restrained, but the power to imprison is wholly 
unrestricted by it?”174  Justice Scalia would claim such, but his reasoning 
is weak because his arguments would reduce the Eighth Amendment to 
meaningless words.175 
In contrast, the utilitarian policies behind punishments – 
rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation – do not support a 
proportionality requirement.176  Utilitarian theories are forward-looking 
to future behavior, harm, and benefits, whereas proportionality is 
backward-looking to the seriousness of the offense committed.177  
Mandatory sentencing laws, such as Three Strikes, do not work because 
they leave no room for consideration of these goals when determining 
the appropriate sentence.178 
The policy that supports proportionality is retribution.179  Under a 
retribution theory, the seriousness of the crime “conveys the magnitude 
of the censure.”180  Therefore, it would be unjust to not proportion 
 
 172. Id.  See supra note 19 for the text of the Eighth Amendment. 
 173. Solem, 463 U.S. at 289.  “It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser punishment of a fine 
and the greater punishment of death were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the 
intermediate punishment of imprisonment were not.”  Id.  See also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1009 
(White, J., dissenting) (discussing the text of the Eight Amendment); Eli Velasquez, The Shaping of 
an American Consensus Against the Execution of Mentally Retarded Criminals: A Case Note on 
Atkins v. Virginia, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 955, 980 (2003) (discussing how the Eighth Amendment 
includes a proportionality principle because it prohibits “excessive sanctions”). 
 174. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1010 (White, J., dissenting). 
 175. Id.  Justice Scalia claims that if Americans had wanted a proportionality principle they 
would have included one.  Id.  He also claims that no punishment would have been unusual because 
the government was new and had no track record regarding criminal law.  Id.  However, criminal 
law was in existence in the States, and “there would have been no lack of benchmarks for 
determining unusualness.”  Id. at 1011.  If Justice Scalia’s argument was accepted, the Eighth 
Amendment would have no meaning.  Id.  See also supra note 154 (discussing other weaknesses in 
Scalia’s arguments). 
 176. Parr, supra note 163, at 60.  Rehabilitation attempts to prevent future crime by creating a 
positive change in offenders.  Id. at 61.  Deterrence uses the threat of punishment to “deter persons 
at large (general deterrence) or particular individuals (specific deterrence) from offending or re-
offending.”  Id. at 60.  Incapacitation reduces crime by physically restraining offenders from 
committing additional crimes.  Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Reform in Minnesota, Ten Years After: Reflections on Dale 
G. Parent’s Structuring Criminal Sentences: The Evolution of Minnesota’s Sentencing Guidelines, 
75 MINN. L. REV. 727, 741 (1991). 
 179. Parr, supra note 163, at 61.  Retribution is expressing “censure for the particular conduct.”  
Id. 
 180. Id.  If two crimes are significantly different in seriousness, their punishments should be 
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sentences to the seriousness of the offense.181 
Another policy concern is that without a proportionality review, 
there would be no check on state legislatures’ power.182  Imagine if a 
state “legislature makes overtime parking a felony punishable by life 
imprisonment.”183  Without a proportionality principle, there would be 
no way for the Supreme Court to strike down imposition of this type of 
sentence.184 
B.  The Sentence in Lockyer Was Unconstitutional 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was correct in deciding that the 
lower court’s decision in Lockyer was unconstitutional because it was 
contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established law.185  
However, the Supreme Court held the opposite.186  The first inquiry 
under the AEDPA considers what law is clearly established.187  There is 
not much disagreement that Rummel, Solem, and Harmelin are clearly 
established federal law.188 
The next step is to determine whether the decision was “contrary 
to” or an “unreasonable application of” this clearly established federal 
law.189  Contrary usually means “diametrically different, opposite in 
 
significantly different.  Id.  If the two offenses do not differ much, then neither should their 
sentences.  Id. 
 181. Id.  “Imposition of an unwarranted amount of punishment . . . is unprincipled and unjust.”  
Parr, supra note 163, at 62. 
 182. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1018. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See supra notes 124-33 and accompanying text for the Ninth Circuit’s decision. 
 186. See supra notes 134-45 and accompanying text for the Supreme Court’s decision. 
 187. Williams, 529 U.S. at 379.  The area of relevant law is limited to the law determined by 
the United States Supreme Court.  Id. at 381.  “A rule that ‘breaks new ground or imposes a new 
obligation on the States or the Federal Government,’ falls outside this universe of federal law.”  Id. 
(quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301).  The law must also be “dictated by precedent existing at the time 
the defendant’s conviction became final.”  Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301).  If a law is 
expressed in generalized terms rather than as a bright-line rule, it still may be clear enough for this 
purpose.  Id. at 382.  Even if the rule requires a case-by-case examination, the multitude of 
applications do not themselves create a new rule; the rule is still clearly established for the purposes 
of the AEDPA.  Id. (citing Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308-309 (1992) (opinion concurring in 
judgment)). 
 188. Lockyer, 2001 WL 1528384, at *10.  “A proper analysis of gross disproportionality 
requires a comparison to all three cases.”  Id.  Under these cases, the court must first compare the 
penalty’s harshness to the offense’s gravity to determine if an inference of gross disproportionality 
is raised.  Id.  If there is such an inference, then the court must compare sentences imposed on 
others in the same jurisdiction with the current sentence.  Id.  Next, the court must compare 
sentences imposed for commission of the same offense in other jurisdictions.  Id. 
 189. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). 
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character or nature, or mutually opposed.”190  The latter inquiry uses an 
objectively unreasonable standard.191 
Because Solem is clearly established federal law and the lower 
court failed to review that case, the lower court unreasonably applied 
clearly established federal law.192  However, the Supreme Court decided 
that the only clearly established federal law was a gross 
disproportionality principle.193  This is incorrect because a case that is 
repeatedly applied as precedent cannot be unclear.194  The lower court 
also unreasonably applied federal law by holding that Andrade’s 
sentence was not grossly disproportionate to his crime.195  Many 
sentences for crimes and prior strikes that were worse than Andrade’s 
have been held to be grossly disproportionate.196  The Supreme Court 
 
 190. Id. at 698 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 495 (1976)).  A 
court violates the “contrary to” clause if it “applies a rule different from the governing law set forth 
in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] have done on a 
set of materially indistinguishable facts.”  Id. at 694 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-405).  See 
also Young v. Dretke, No. 02-50341, 2004 WL 42623, at *5 (5th Cir. Tex. 2004) (stating the same); 
Mitchell v. Esparza, 124 S.Ct. 7, 10 (2003) (stating the same).  “A state court need not even be 
aware of our precedents, ‘so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision 
contradicts them.’”  Mitchell, 124 S.Ct. at 10. 
 191. Bell, 535 U.S. at 694.  A state court violates the “unreasonable application” clause of the 
AEDPA if it “correctly identifies the governing legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions but 
unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case.”  Id.  See also Young, 2004 WL 42623 at 
*5 (defining the phrase “unreasonable application of”). 
 192. See supra notes 139, 143 and accompanying text (discussing how Solem was clearly 
established and why not applying it is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal 
law). 
 193. See supra note 139 and accompanying text for this discussion. 
 194. See e.g. Ewing, 538 U.S. 11; Romero, 99 Cal. App. 4th 1418; Lockyer, 2001 WL 
1528384. 
 195. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing why the sentence in Lockyer was 
grossly disproportionate).  See also infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text (discussing why the 
sentence in Lockyer was grossly disproportionate).  Most violent crimes in California receive 
shorter sentences than the one Andrade received.  Allan Ides, Habeas Standards of Review Under 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1): A Commentary on Statutory Text and Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 677, 732 (2003).  Andrade’s sentence was twice as long as any he would receive in 
most other jurisdictions.  Id.  Only in Louisiana would Andrade have received such a severe 
sentence.  Id. at 733. 
 196. Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Imposition of Enhanced Sentence Under Recidivist 
Statute as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 27 A.L.R. FED. 110, § 7 (2004).  A sentence imposed 
under a valid recidivist statute may be unconstitutional if it fails to take into account the goals of 
punishment, it is imposed only for the purpose of hurting the defendant, and it is grossly 
disproportionate.  Id.  A defendant, whose prior strikes consisted of writing a bad check for $50, 
transporting $140 worth of forged checks across state lines, and perjury, received a life sentence 
which the court held to be grossly disproportionate under West Virginia’s valid recidivist statute.  
Id.  A life sentence received for heroin possession was grossly disproportionate when the maximum 
sentence for a first time offender was three years.  Id.  A defendant convicted of petty theft should 
not receive a life sentence.  See WITKIN & EPSTEIN, supra note 10, § 355.  Earnest Bray Jr. was 
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decided that Andrade’s sentence could not be held grossly 
disproportionate because it fit within the unclear contours of the 
proportionality principle.197  As discussed previously, the federal law 
with regards to proportionality of sentences is clear enough to determine 
that Andrade’s sentence is grossly disproportionate.198  If the Supreme 
Court continues with its line of reasoning, no term-of-years sentence will 
ever be found grossly disproportionate.199 
The lower court also violated the AEDPA’s “contrary to” prong 
because Solem is materially indistinguishable from Lockyer.200  The 
Supreme Court’s main problem with holding that Solem and Lockyer are 
on-point with each other is the fact that the defendant in Solem did not 
have the possibility of parole and the defendant in Lockyer did.201  
However, a minimum sentence of fifty years is the functional equivalent 
of no parole; thus, the fact that a sentence contains the possibility of 
parole should not carry a great deal of weight when determining 
 
convicted of shoplifting videotapes which he blames on his use of drugs.  Jason Hoppin, 9th Circuit 
in the Strike Zone: Judges Ask Sentencing Scheme Trailblazer to Argue Two More Appeals, S.F. 
RECORDER, Nov. 20, 2001, at 1.  He had prior convictions for armed robbery.  Id.  Richard Brown 
was convicted of car theft.  Id.  His prior strikes occurred 10-15 years previously.  Id.  Both men 
received 25-years-to-life sentences as opposed to Andrade’s sentence of 50 years to life.  Id.  See 
also e.g.  Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 371, 375 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (finding that a 
sentence of 20 years and a fine of $10,000 on each count for possession of marijuana with an intent 
to distribute and distribution of marijuana was grossly disproportionate); Robinson v. California, 
370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (finding that a sentence of 90 days for being a drug addict was cruel and 
unusual because “even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ 
of having a common cold”); Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d 706, 707, 710, 712 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that a life sentence for a first-time conviction of .238 grams of cocaine base worth $33.33 
was grossly disproportionate); Thompson v. Bock, No. 01-10021-BC, 2004 WL 306106, *2, *16 
(E.D. Mich. 2004) (discussing that concurrent sentences of forty to sixty years for being a felon in 
possession of a firearm is severe and the court would have chosen a lesser minimum sentence); 
State v. Davis, 79 P.3d 64, ¶¶ 7, 10, 48 (Ariz. 2003) (holding that a minimum sentence of 52 years 
imprisonment for “four counts of sexual misconduct with a minor” was disproportionate after taking 
the particular facts into question). 
 197. See supra note 144 (discussing why the sentence in Lockyer was not an unreasonable 
application of clearly established federal law). 
 198. See supra note 192 and accompanying text (discussing that Solem is clearly established 
federal law). 
 199. Nathan H. Seltzer, Note, When the Tail Wags the Dog: The Collision Course Between 
Recidivism Statutes and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 83 B.U.L. REV. 921, 926 (2003).  Only the 
“unrealistic example of a life sentence for overtime parking” would qualify.  Id. 
 200. See supra note 132 (discussing the analogy between the Solem and Lockyer cases).  The 
facts of Solem are on-point with the facts of Lockyer.  Seltzer, supra note 199, at 928.  By the Court 
holding that they were distinguishable and that Andrade’s sentence was not grossly 
disproportionate, it merely claims there is a proportionality principle but leaves it without any 
meaning.  Id. 
 201. See supra note 139 (discussing why Lockyer was not materially indistinguishable from 
Solem). 
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proportionality.202  Therefore, it is contrary to clearly established federal 
law to reach a different conclusion than that which the Solem Court 
reached, which was that the sentence was grossly disproportionate.203 
C.  The Policies Behind California’s Three Strikes Are Not Being Met 
Three Strikes is intended to incapacitate those who threaten the 
public safety and deter illegal conduct.204  However, offenders who 
threaten public safety are not the ones who are usually affected by Three 
Strikes.205  Individuals sentenced under Three Strikes tend to be older 
 
 202. See supra notes 132 (discussing how Andrade’s sentence with parole is analogous to the 
sentence in Solem that does not include parole).  But see Lugo v. Hickman, No. C 99-5196 WHA 
(PR), 2003 WL 1798122 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that because the defendant had the possibility of 
parole his sentence was distinguishable from Solem).  Just because a convict is given a sentence that 
includes the possibility of parole does not mean that he will be paroled, only that he would be 
eligible for parole.  Sonner v. State, 955 P.2d 673, 675 (Nev. 1998).  The granting of parole does not 
change a prisoner’s status as a convict.  67A C.J.S. Pardon & Parole § 61 (2003).  A paroled 
prisoner is still in the custody of the state.  Id.  “Parole is in legal effect imprisonment.”  Id.  In 
addition, a lengthy sentence has the same effect as a life term.  People v. Carson, 560 N.W.2d 657, 
663 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).  See also State v. Davis, 79 P.3d 64, ¶¶ 7, 10, 48 (Ariz. 2003) (holding 
that a sentence of 52 years without the possibility of parole was grossly disproportionate even 
though the crime was four counts of sexual misconduct with a minor).  Judge Paez found that the 
fact that Andrade will be 87 years old before he is eligible for parole makes his sentence the 
functional equivalent of a life sentence.  Tony Mauro, Supremes Grant Review of Three Strikes 
Cases, S.F. RECORDER, April 2, 2002.  See also Danya W. Blair, A Matter of Life and Death: Why 
Life Without Parole Should Be A Sentencing Option in Texas, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 191, 206 (1994) 
(discussing how proponents of Texas’ forty-year minimum capital murder sentence see it as 
equivalent to life without the possibility of parole).  But see United States v. Ortiz, No. 93-5473 slip 
op. at 2 (4th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that there is no proportionality review for sentences of 
less than life without the possibility of parole); United States v. Lockhart, 58 F.3d 86, 89 (4th Cir. 
1995) (holding the same). 
 203. Solem, 463 U.S. at 303 and see supra notes 75 and 82. 
 204. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 15.  See also CHARLES E. TORCIA, 1 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 1 
(15th ed. 2003).  The goals of Three Strikes is to keep the public safe by incarcerating recidivist and 
to deter criminal conduct.  Daniel Rogers, Note, People v. Fuhrman and Three Strikes: Have the 
Traditional Goals of Recidivist Sentencing Been Sacrificed at the Altar of Public Passion?, 20 T. 
JEFFERSON L. REV. 139, 164 (1998). 
 205. David Schultz, No Joy in Mudville Tonight: The Impact of “Three Strike” Laws on State 
and Federal Corrections Policy, Resources, and Crime Control, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
557, 573-74 (2000).  Three Strikes has been unsuccessful in targeting violent felons because its 
application has mostly occurred in cases involving marijuana.  Id.  The main triggers for Three 
Strikes are non-violent crimes and drug offenses.  Id. at 574. These type of offenses account for 
85% of those convicted under Three Strikes.  Id. 
[D]uring the first eight months of California’s three strikes law, 70% of those sentenced 
under it were for nonviolent and drug related offenses, and 41% of those subject to three 
strikes were there because of a property offense as opposed to 17% of those who 
committed a second strike felony offense. 
Id.  “Between April 1994 and March 1996, only 14.5 percent of two-strikes sentences and 25.5 
percent of three-strikes sentences were for crimes against the person.”  Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of 
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and, therefore, less likely to commit more crimes because they are at the 
end of their criminal careers.206  The types of individuals who are most 
greatly affected by Three Strikes are not those individuals whom Three 
Strikes intended to incarcerate.207 
Furthermore, Three Strikes is not deterring crime.208  A comparison 
 
the First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of California’s Two- and Three-Strikes Legislation, 31 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 159, 164 (2002).  “Property crimes accounted for 41.1 percent of two-strikes 
sentences and 38.8 percent of three-strikes sentences, while drug offenses accounted for 31.6 
percent and 22 percent, respectively.”  Id.  “As of June 30, 2002, the total number of defendants 
serving life in prison under Three Strikes for identifiable offenses was 7,148.”  Ricciardulli, supra 
note 41, at 32.  “42.7% of the total defendants serving life were there due to non-serious current 
offenses.”  Id. 
Of this total, in 344 cases, or 4.8%, the current offense was petty theft with a prior; in 
115 of the cases, or 1.6%, the current offense was non-vehicular grand theft; 457 cases, 
or 6.4%, were commercial/vehicular burglaries; and in 647 cases, or 9.1%, the current 
offense was possession of controlled substances for personal use. 
Id. 
 206. Gordon, supra note 8, at 586.  The most violent criminals tend to be under the age of 24.  
Id.  Criminal behavior normally declines as a person enters his thirties and forties.  Id.  “[F]elony 
offenders in their 30s and 40s are eight and ten times, respectively, more likely to be sentenced 
under Three Strikes than felons in their early 20s.”  Mike Males & Dan Macallair, Striking Out: The 
Failure of California’s “Three Strikes and You’re Out” Law, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 65, 66 
(1999).  However, Three Strikes will necessarily affect the older criminals who have had a chance 
to accumulate a criminal record.  Gordon, supra note 8, at 586.  “From 1978 to 1998, annual felony 
arrests of adults over age 30 increased by almost 167,000, while arrests of adults between ages 20 
and 29 increased by just over 32,000.”  Males & Macallair, supra, at 66.  While California’s 
population’s age increased by four years, the age of an arrestee increased by seven years.  Id.  After 
age 28, there is a steady and serious decline in criminal activity.  Id. at 68.  The effects of 
incapacitation are maximized when the most serious offenders are incarcerated.  Alex R. Piquero, 
David P. Farrington & Alfred Blumstein, The Criminal Career Paradigm, 30 CRIME & JUST. 359, 
465 (2003).  More crimes will be averted when high offenders are incapacitated during the time 
when they are at a high risk of offending.  Id. at 466.  Incapacitation policies are more effective 
when used during active criminal careers as opposed to when careers are in a downswing.  Id. 
 207. McCullogh, supra note 31, at 280.  Considering the murders that prompted the passage of 
Three Strikes, it is clear that the law intended to keep serious or violent convicts incarcerated.  Id. at 
278.  The pamphlets distributed to voters for the Three Strikes proposal stated that Three Strikes 
“would keep ‘rapists, murderers and child molesters behind bars where they belong.’”  Id. at 280.  
See also id. at 280 n.20.  Therefore, the voters did not intend that Three Strikes would “result in 
numerous life sentences for petty theft convictions.”  Id. at 280-81.  Even Polly Klaas’ father knew 
that Three Strikes was not working as intended, and he withdrew his support for it stating “‘we 
blindly supported the . . . initiative in the mistaken belief that it dealt only with violent crimes.’”  
Michael Vitiello, Punishment and Democracy: A Hard Look at Three Strikes’ Overblown Promises, 
90 CAL. L. REV. 257, 264 (2002) (book review) [hereinafter Vitiello, Hard Look]. 
 208. See Franklin E. Zimring & Sam Kamin, Facts, Fallacies, and California’s Three Strikes, 
40 DUQ. L. REV. 605 (2002) (discussing how Three Strikes is not reducing crime).  While crime 
rates declined after March 1994 in nine major California cities, the crime rate had begun to decline 
17 months before Three Strikes was enacted and crime continued to drop at the same rate after 
enactment.  Id. at 605-06.  Crime in California was only reduced by six-tenths of one percent after 
enactment of Three Strikes.  Id. at 606.  The deterrent effect of Three Strikes is only between zero 
and two percent of California crime.  Id. at 606-07.  The California Crime Index was not decreased 
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of states that have Three Strikes laws and States that do not shows that 
Three Strikes laws do not deter crime.209  Three Strikes has no effect on 
the criminal mentality.210  A growing body of research establishes that 
increased rates of incarceration do not translate into lowered crime rates 
as previously assumed.211  Crime rates have fluctuated while 
 
by Three Strikes below what was expected by pre-existing trends.  Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl 
Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST. 
143, 177 (2003).  The sharp decline in crime directly after Three Strikes enactment cannot be 
explained by that enactment.  Vitiello, Hard Look, supra note 207, at 268.  The results of longer 
prison terms would not kick in immediately.  Id.  The results would not come into effect until after 
an offender served the portion of his sentence he would have served anyway absent Three Strikes.  
Id.  “Many criminologists suggest that the crime rate is dropping faster in California than elsewhere 
in the nation due to factors such as ‘a strong economy, a decreasing number of people in their 
crime-prone years, and fewer turf battles among crack cocaine dealers.’”  Id. at 270.  “Crime 
dropped 21.3% in the six counties that have been the most lenient in enforcing Three Strikes, while 
the toughest counties experienced only a 12.7% drop in their crime rates.”  Id.; Michael Vitiello, 
Three Strikes Law: A Real or Imagined Deterrent to Crime?, 29-SPG HUM. RTS. 3, 4 (2002) 
[hereinafter Vitiello, Real or Imagined].  See also Males & Macallair, supra note 206, at 67-68 
(comparing the crime rates in counties that invoked Three Strikes frequently with those that are 
more lenient).  Sacramento and Los Angeles counties use Three Strikes seven times more than 
Alameda and San Francisco counties who rarely use the law, but they do not have a larger decrease 
in crime.  Id. at 68.  “San Francisco County, which had the lowest rate of Three Strike 
commitments, experienced a 35 percent decline in homicides, a 33 percent decline in all violent 
crimes, and a 28 percent decline in all index crimes.”  Id.  “Sacramento County, which had the 
highest rate of three strike commitments, [only] experienced a 23 percent decline in homicides, a 10 
percent decline in all violent crimes, and a 7 percent decline in all index crimes.”  Id.  “Santa Clara 
[County], the sixth most frequent county to employ the ‘Three Strikes’ law, experienced a rise in 
violent crimes after the ‘Three Strikes’ law went into effect.”  Tina M. Olson, Comment, Strike One, 
Ready for More?: The Consequences of Plea Bargaining “First Strike” Offenders Under 
California’s “Three Strikes” Law, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 545, 560 (2000). 
 209. Doob & Webster, supra note 208, at 175.  “From 1994-1995, violent crime in non-three 
strikes states fell nearly three times more rapidly than in three-strikes states.”  Id.  “In non-three-
strikes states, violent crime fell by 4.6 percent.”  Id.  “In states which have passed three-strikes laws, 
crime fell by only 1.7 percent.”  Id.  “From 1994-1995, total crime decreased by an average of 0.4 
percent in the three-strikes states and decreased by an average of 1.2 percent in states which have 
not implemented the three-strikes law.”  Id. 
 210. Id. at 182.  Sixty prisoners who had been in prison at least twice and at least once for 
armed robbery or burglary were interviewed.  Doob & Webster, supra note 208, at 182.  They stated 
that they did not consider the legal consequences when planning their crimes nor they think about 
getting caught.  Id.  Fifty-two of the prisoners never thought they would be caught; therefore, their 
possible sentence was unimportant.  Id.  Thirty-two of the prisoners did not even know what their 
punishments might be.  Id.  For those that had stopped committing crimes, reasons other than 
punishment were reported.  Id. 
 211. Mauer, Collateral Consequences, supra note 3, at 1492.  See also Symposium, The 
Impact of Truth-In-Sentencing and Three Strikes Legislation: Prison Populations, State Budgets, 
and Crime Rates, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 75 (1999) (discussing that there is no correlation 
between increased incarceration and lower crime rates).  Massive increases in incarceration have 
failed to translate into a noticeable reduction in crime rates.  Thomas C. Castellano, Limits of the 
Criminal Sanction in Controlling Crime: A Plea for Balanced Punishments, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 427, 
433 (1999).  A study by Irwin and Austin found that changes in crime rates between 1980 and 1991 
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incarceration rates have experienced steady increases.212  The overall 
crime rate in California rose 2.4% in 2003.213  Instead of lowering crime 
rates, increased incarceration, may actually be increasing them.214 
D.  Three Strikes Does Not Make Sense Financially 
It costs $21,000 to $22,000 a year to incarcerate one prisoner, and 
the prison population is increasing dramatically due to Three Strikes.215  
It costs even more to incarcerate an aging prisoner, who Three Strikes is 
 
were not strongly related to increases in incarceration.  Id.  Between 1985 and 1995 the 
incarceration rate in the United States increased by 92%, but there was little impact on crime rates.  
Cynthia M. Conward, Where Have All the Children Gone?: A Look At Incarcerated Youth in 
America, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2435, 2440 (2001).  Frequent offenders are more likely to be 
imprisoned than less frequent offenders; therefore, offending rates among prisoners are higher than 
among those who are free.  David Cole, As Freedom Advances: The Paradox of Severity in 
American Criminal Justice, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 455, 461-62 (2001).  A study by the National 
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences found that the time served per violent crime 
from 1975 to 1989 when tripled had no measurable impact on violent crime rates.  Id. at 462.  The 
chances of being arrested for committing a crime in the United States are low.  Florida Corrections 
Commission, Crime Rates and Incarceration Rates: A Critical Review of the Literature, available at 
http://fcc.state.fl.us/fcc/reports/rates/rate.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2004).  Criminals know this; 
therefore, deterrence does not work.  Id.  Many factors influence crime.  Id.  The relationship 
between crime rates and incarceration is greatly weakened when factors other than incarceration are 
included.  Id. 
 212. Mauer, Promises, supra note 9, at 12.  New York is an illustrative example of the lack of 
correlation between increased incarceration and lowering crime rates.  Id.  New York violent crime 
rates declined 34% between 1990 and 1995 and property crime rates dropped 39%.  Id.  However, 
New York City’s jail population actually declined and New York state’s prison population barely 
rose above the rate of increase of the national prison population.  Id. 
 213. Three Strikes and You’re Out Official Website, Three Strikes Information, available at 
http://threestrikes.org/articles.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2004). 
 214. R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 571, 596-97 (2003).  Diana Rose and Todd Clear, two researchers at the City University of 
New York, found that crime rates went up after a certain incarceration level is reached.  Eric 
Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, How to Construct an Underclass, or How the War on Drugs Became a 
War on Education, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 61, 80 n.95 (2002).  Increased incarceration rates 
have weakened the communities’ capacity to “raise children, provide a healthy environment for 
families, provide jobs for young and old, and sustain a vibrant civic life.”  Id.  It is this weakening 
that has increased crime rates as incarceration rates increase.  Id.  The children of incarcerated 
parents are six times more likely than children without imprisoned parents to become incarcerated.  
Conward, supra note 211, at 2440. 
 215. Ardaiz, supra, note 48 at 27.  As of 1998, at least 1,300 people had been incarcerated in 
California under Three Strikes.  Cowart, supra note 3, at 643.  See also supra, note 205 (discussing 
how many people have been imprisoned under Three Strikes and how often California uses the 
law).  It is believed that to achieve a 10% drop in the crime rate, the prison population will have to 
double.  Piquero, Farrington & Blumstein, supra note 206, at 381.  Another effect Three Strikes will 
have on the prison population is that the number of older prisoners will increase and they cost the 
state more to incarcerate than younger criminals.  Vitiello, Real or Imagined, supra note 208, at 4. 
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most likely to effect.216  Some say that these costs are offset by society’s 
economic benefits from reduced crime rates.217  However, as discussed 
previously, crime rates are not being reduced.218  “Increased funds 
are . . . necessary to maintain the prison housing of . . . inmates, as 
opposed to less costly methods of punishment.”219  Higher education will 
take the hit in the state budget for these extra costs.220  Variations on 
 
 216. Nkechi Taifa, “Three-Strikes-and-You’re-Out”—Mandatory Life Imprisonment for Third 
Time Felons, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 717, 722 (1995).  Three Strikes keeps prisoners in jail until 
they are well beyond the age of criminal activity.  Id.  However, only one percent of crime is 
committed by individuals over the age of sixty.  Id.  Absent Three Strikes, young criminals are still 
kept in prison after a third violent felony well past middle age when the risk they pose on society is 
small.  Id.  The cost of incarcerating an aging criminal is three times more than the cost of 
incarcerating the average prisoner.  Id.  “Three younger, more violent-prone offenders could be held 
in the place of one geriatric prisoner.”  Id. 
 217. Ardaiz, supra note 49, at 27.  See also Brandon C. Welsh & David P. Farrington, 
Monetary Costs and Benefits of Crime Prevention Programs, 27 CRIME & JUST. 305, 305-06 (2000) 
(discussing the tangible and intangible costs of crime). 
 218. See supra notes 217-23 and accompanying text (discussing how crime is not being 
deterred by Three Strikes). 
 219. Cowart, supra note 3, at 632. 
 220. Loren L. Barr, Comment, The “Three Strikes” Dilemma: Crime Reduction At Any Price?, 
36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 107, 129 (1995).  “The RAND study concludes that three strikes will cost 
Californians an additional $5.5 billion annually, or about $16,000 per serious crime prevented.”  Id. 
at 128.  Prior to the enactment of Three Strikes, state spending was as follows: “36% for K-12 
education, 35% for health and welfare, 12% for higher education, 9% for miscellaneous services 
such as pollution control and workplace safety, and 9% for corrections.”  Id.  By 2002, Three 
Strikes will increase the budget allocation for corrections to 18%.  Id.  This will increase taxes by 
$300 per year per taxpayer or one of the other budget areas could be cut.  Id.  Increasing taxes is 
unlikely at this point in California given the current political situation.  Id. at 129.  The budget for 
primary education cannot be reduced because it has a set minimum level.  Barr, supra, at 129.  The 
budgets for welfare and health have been growing each year, therefore, spending cuts are unlikely to 
come from these areas.  Id.  By 2002, “the state will be spending 46% of its general fund on primary 
education, 35% on health and welfare, and 18% on corrections, leaving a virtually nonexistent 1% 
for the combined higher education and miscellaneous services that now consume 21% of the state 
budget.”  Id.  However, Three Strikes may not be implemented as planned.  James Austin, “Three 
Strikes and You’re Out”: The Likely Consequences on the Courts, Prisons, and Crime in California 
and Washington State, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 239, 247 (1994).  With prosecutor’s discretion, 
they could eliminate prior strikes in order to facilitate plea bargaining.  Id.  But see infra notes 241-
44 and accompanying text (discussing the loss of judicial integrity resulting from prosecutorial 
discretion); infra note 233 (discussing that most Three Strikes cases are not being pled).  Proponents 
of Three Strikes argue that only a few thousand more individuals will be incarcerated over two 
decades.  Robert Heglin, Note, A Flurry of Recidivist Legislation Means: “Three Strikes and You’re 
Out,” 20 J. LEGIS. 213, 224 (1994).  See also Kent Scheidegger & Michael Rushford, The Social 
Benefits of Confining Habitual Criminals, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 59, 61 (1999) (discussing that 
the actual prison population is much less than that predicted by RAND when it projected the costs 
of Three Strikes).  Many of these prisoners would be recidivist and would keep costing the system 
more money for repeatedly going through the judicial system.  Heglin, supra, at 224.  See also 
Meredith McClain, Note, Three  Strikes and You’re Out”: The Solution to the Repeat Offender 
Problem?, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 97, 121-22 (1996) (discussing that it costs more to prosecute 
recidivists than to keep them imprisoned and Three Strikes only affects a small number of 
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Three Strikes that cost less, such as requiring the third strike to be a 
serious felony, are possible, but they would also be less effective at 
crime reduction.221 
Since Three Strikes was passed, jury trials and their related 
expenses have increased by 40% in California.222  “Defendants charged 
under [Three Strikes] seek a [jury] trial in hope for acquittal instead of 
opting for the certainty of enhanced sentences under the second or third 
strike.”223  Court resources are being diverted to adjudicating Three 
Strikes cases and away from civil cases.224  Some counties have tried 
 
recidivists).  The intangible costs of crime, such as the loss of life or physical injury and property 
loss, far outweigh the monetary costs of Three Strikes.  Heglin, supra, at 224.  Billions are spent to 
compensate victims for these types of loss and to prosecute habitual offenders.  Derrick A. Carter, 
Reflections of the Proposed Federal Crime Bill, 8-JUN NBA NAT’L B. ASS’N MAG. 23, 23 (1994).  
See also Scheidegger, supra, at 61-63 (discussing the intangible costs of crime); Ilene M. Shinbein, 
Note, “Three-Strikes and You’re Out”: A Good Political Slogan to Reduce Crime, But a Failure in 
Its Application, 22 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 175, 199-200 (1996) (discussing 
that billions are spent on the costs of crime other than those related to prosecuting criminals).  But 
see supra note 225 and accompanying text (discussing the number of individuals that have been 
imprisoned under Three Strikes); supra note 230 and accompanying text (discussing the extreme 
cost of Three Strikes and the areas of California’s budget that will suffer). 
 221. Peter W. Greenwood et al., California’s New Three-Strikes Law: Benefits, Costs, and 
Alternatives, RAND, available at http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB4009/RB4009.word.html 
(last visited Sept. 3, 2004). 
 222. Cowart, supra note 3, at 661.  Four percent of all felonies in Los Angeles go to trial, but 
25% of Three Strikes cases are going to trial.  Schultz, supra note 215, at 575.  “Second- and third-
strike cases account for forty-eight percent of the state’s jury trials.”  Joshua E. Bowers, “The 
Integrity of the Game is Everything”: The Problem of Geographic Disparity in Three Strikes, 76 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1164, 1194 (2001).  Typical jury trials do not last as long as Three Strikes trials 
because more motions are filed by defendants and they fight harder.  Id. at 1194-95.  In addition, 
there has to be a second trial for sentencing.  Id. at 1195.  California trial times have increased to 
106 days from 46 days for second strike cases and to 160 days for third-strike cases.  Id.  San Diego 
County predicts a tripling and Santa Clara County predicts a doubling of jury trials.  Harvey Gee, 
New Paradigms of Criminal Justice for the Twenty-First Century: A Review Essay, 27 OHIO N.U.L. 
REV. 29, 64 (2000). 
 223. Schultz, supra note 215, at 575.  See also Samara Marion, Justice by Geography? A Study 
of San Diego County’s Three Strikes Sentencing Practices from July – December 1996, 11 STAN. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 29, 35 (1999) (discussing the increase in Three Strikes jury trials).  Only fourteen 
percent of second-strike cases are pled out and only six percent of third-strike cases have ended this 
way.  J. Anthony Kline, Comment: The Politicalization of Crime, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1087, 1089 
(1995).  “The result . . . is more trials, more public costs for prosecutors, and more costs associated 
with public defenders who represent most of those coming to bat for three strike felonies.”  Schultz, 
supra note 215, at 575.  “Because many three strikers are either unable or ineligible to make bail 
and more of them demand trials, local jails have become more crowded.”  Id. at 580.  Therefore, the 
costs of housing more individuals and paying for more security personnel to guard them have 
increased.  Id.  Pretrial detention has increased 11% in California local jails as a result of Three 
Strikes.  Id.  Many criminals sentenced under Three Strikes were convicted of drug crimes, but drug 
treatment programs or traditional sentences are less expensive than Three Strikes sentences.  Id. 
 224. Gee, supra note 232, at 63.  Nine out of twenty courts have indicated a lack of courtrooms 
for civil trials.  Id. Three out of ten superior court districts are no longer hearing civil cases.  Kline, 
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creative solutions to help with the increased jury trials and expenses 
such as asking for reimbursement from the state, allocating specialists to 
hear Three Strikes cases, releasing prisoners early, and increasing 
budgets.225 
E.  Three Strikes Does Not Allow for the Maintenance of Judicial 
Integrity 
The monetary expense of Three Strikes will result in a loss of 
judicial system integrity.226  There will not be enough prosecutors to try 
Three Strikes cases.227  Therefore, prosecutors will use their discretion to 
avoid Three Strikes trials instead of applying the law.228  Judges have 
also found ways to avoid imposing enhanced sentences under Three 
Strikes even though they are not supposed to have the power to do so.229  
Judges and prosecutors are not the only ones who have found ways to 
avoid imposing Three Strikes; witnesses, jurors and victims have also 
done so.230 
 
supra note 233, at 1090.  Half of the district courtrooms have been changed from civil to criminal 
trials.  Id.  The Los Angeles Superior Court predicts that eventually two-thirds to three-fourths of 
civil courtrooms will be diverted to criminal trials.  Id.  Because of a shortage of criminal judges, 
many civil judges have been reassigned to criminal courts.  Gee, supra note 232, at 64.  Twenty-five 
percent of the courts are so overcome with criminal trials that they can no longer hear civil cases.  
Id. 
 225. Gee, supra note 232, at 64.  Los Angeles County submitted a claim to the state seeking 
reimbursement of $169 million for Three Strikes costs from 1994-1996.  Id.  San Diego County 
implemented a program where specialists, including public defenders, judges, and prosecutors, hear 
Three Strikes cases.  Id.  Some counties have increased their criminal justice agencies’ budgets and 
others have shifted resources away from civil cases to criminal cases.  E. D’Angelo, Office of the 
Legislative Analyst, 15-WTR CAL. REG. L. REP. 28, 30 (1995).  Other counties have begun releasing 
non-Three Strikes inmates from jail early.  Id. 
 226. Barr, supra note 230, at 135. 
 227. Id. at 136.  Defendants will be advised by their attorneys to assert their right to a speedy 
trial.  Id. at 135.  However, since there will be so many Three Strikes trials, there will not be enough 
prosecutors to try all these cases.  Id. 
 228. Id. at 136.  Some defendants will not be charged or will be charged to lesser offenses to 
avoid longer Three Strikes jury trials.  Id.  “Wobblers that should probably be charged as felonies 
will be charged as misdemeanors to avoid a three strikes jury trial.”  Barr, supra note 230, at 136.  
“Prosecutors will be forced to strike the prior convictions of two and three strike defendants who the 
public would expect to receive, and who may well deserve, enhanced three strike sentences.”  Id.  
Some prosecutors just choose to ignore Three Strikes’ ban on plea bargaining.  Erik G. Luna, 
Foreword: Three Strikes in a Nutshell, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 25 (1998). 
 229. Luna, supra, note 238 at 24.  Judges have dismissed prior strikes in order to place the 
defendant outside the sentencing scheme of Three Strikes.  Id.  Judges have reduced crimes which 
were clearly felonies to misdemeanors.  Id.  Finally, some judges just do not apply Three Strikes.  
Id. 
 230. Id. at 25.  Two times burglary victims refused to testify because they feared the burglars 
would receive a life sentence.  Id.  See also supra note 8 (discussing other times victims, jurors, and 
38
Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol38/iss2/4
DONHAM1.DOC 3/7/2005  11:09 AM 
2005] LOCKYER V. ANDRADE 407 
Three Strikes was not intended to be a discretionary law and yet is 
has become one.231  The amount of discretion invested in prosecutors 
alone results in a loss of judicial integrity.232  Differing approaches to 
enforcing Three Strikes reflect a prosecutor’s individual principles, and 
not the legislature’s intent.233  The discretion invested in prosecutors 
increases their plea bargaining power, thereby tilting the playing field 
drastically and unfairly in their favor.234 
F.  How Does California’s Three Strikes Law Compare with Similar 
Laws 
California’s Three Strikes law is the harshest of its kind,235 and is 
 
witnesses have circumvented imposition of Three Strikes). 
 231. Bowers, supra note 232, at 1183.  Voters intended Three Strikes to end discretion by 
ending indeterminate sentences.  Id.  However, all they accomplished was to switch discretion from 
the judge to the prosecutor.  Id. See also infra note 243 (discussing the discretion granted 
prosecutors under Three Strikes and its implications). 
 232. Bowers, supra note 232, at 1185.  “Prosecutors in California’s more populous counties 
[are] more likely to strike some offenses than others.”  Schultz, supra note 215, at 575. Equal 
protection issues are raised by a law that invests prosecutors with this amount of discretion.  
Gordon, supra note 8, 578 at n.314.  The differences between counties “is an arbitrary factor and 
has no relation to culpability.”  Id.  “Studies also indicate that local political pressures seem to 
determine the use of three strikes.”  Schultz, supra note 215, at 575.  “In addition, the lack of 
flexibility has discouraged prosecutors from using these laws, and they prefer to employ other 
preexisting habitual offender laws already on the books.”  Id.  The application of Three Strikes 
seems to depend on which county an individual is charged under.  Shepherd, supra note 215, at 164.  
The “southern part of the state is very stringent in its application, whereas counties in the urban 
northern areas are ‘cautious’ in enforcing the law.”  Id.  The fact that prosecutors are invested with 
too much discretion is exemplified by the odd fact that those who committed a single violent felony 
were sentenced to two years more in prison than those who committed two violent felonies.  Charles 
R. Calleros, In the Spirit of Regina Austin’s Contextual Analysis: Exploring Racial Context in Legal 
Method, Writing Assignments and Scholarship, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 281, 295 (2000).  But see 
Ardaiz, supra note 49, at 24-5 (discussing that the public gives prosecutors discretion because it is 
their job to keep the community safe and, in order to maintain consistency, all discretion would 
have to be eliminated which would result in all third-strikers being treated the same regardless of 
the facts and circumstances of the case). 
 233. Bowers, supra note 232, at 1187.  Prosecutors cannot claim that discretion is required 
based on the individual characteristics of those charged under Three Strikes.  Id.  However, some 
prosecutors, such as San Francisco District Attorney Terrence Hallinan, apply or don’t apply the 
law to entire classes of individuals without basing the decision on individual characteristics.  Id. 
 234. Samuel H. Pillsbury, A Problem in Emotive Due Process: California’s Three Strikes Law, 
6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 483, 489 (2002).  In return for a guilty plea on the current offense, 
prosecutors will not charge strike enhancements.  Id.  See also supra note 238 (discussing the evils 
of allowing prosecutors to choose not to charge second and third strike enhancements).  The 
defendant is no longer completely free to choose whether to accept or reject an offer made by the 
prosecutor’s office.  Erica G. Franklin, Note, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the Guilty Plea 
Process: A Debate on the Merits of “Discovery” Waivers, 51 STAN. L. REV. 567, 589 (1999). 
 235. See Ides, supra note 205, at 732 (reviewing the Lockyer case). The two other leading three 
strikes states, Washington and Wisconsin, do not have a rate of incarceration anywhere near that of 
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dramatically different from other states.236  This is exemplified by the 
fact that California has sentenced more offenders under Three Strikes 
than any other state,237 and permits less serious offenses to trigger the 
law.238 
Forty-one states other than California have enacted recidivist 
statutes.239  Unlike California, twenty-five of those states require prior 
convictions to be “brought and tried separately” in order to qualify as 
strikes.240 
 
California.  Cowart, supra note 3, at 625.  See also Romero, 99 Cal. App. 4th at 1433 (discussing 
that Three Strikes is one of the most severe laws of its kind); WITKIN, EPSTEIN & MEMBERS OF THE 
WITKIN LEGAL INSTITUTE, supra note 10 § 355 (discussing that California is the only state where a 
person could receive a sentence of 25 years to life imprisonment for shoplifting a bottle of 
vitamins); Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Habitual Offender Statutes and Criminal 
Deterrence, 34 CONN. L. REV. 55, 55 n.6 (2001) (discussing that California leads the nation in 
toughness and enforcing its three strikes law). 
 236. Vitiello, Hard Look, supra note 207, at 262. 
 237. Id. at 263.  “The number of Three Strikes cases in California dwarfs the number of similar 
cases in all of the other states and the federal system combined.”  Id.  California uses its law more 
than any other state.  Id.  For example, even though California is six times more populous than 
Washington, it uses Three Strikes 33 times more than Washington uses their three strikes law. Id.  
The federal system has only sentenced 35 offenders under their three strikes law since it was 
enacted in 1994 through 1996.  Id.  During the same period, California sentenced 40,000 offenders 
under Three Strikes.  Vitiello, Hard Look, supra note 207, at 263.  There have only been 121 three 
strikes convictions in Washington through August 1998.  Schultz, supra note 215, at 572-73.  
Florida only had 116 convictions through June 1998.  Id. at 573.  In Colorado, North Carolina, New 
Mexico, Tennessee and Pennsylvania, there have been five or less offenders sentenced under each 
state’s three strikes laws through August 1998.  Id.  Wisconsin has sentenced three offenders under 
its three strikes laws, New Jersey has sentenced six, and Utah has not sentenced any under its three 
strikes laws.  Id. 
 238. Vitiello, Hard Look, supra note 207, at 262.  Most other laws only target violent crime, 
but California includes residential burglary as a triggering offense.  Id.  The third triggering strike in 
California does not have to be for a violent crime and can even include crimes that could have been 
charged as misdemeanors.  Mauro, supra note 202. 
 239. Rogers, supra note 204, 159-60.  Twenty-four states and the federal government enacted 
three-strike laws between 1993 and 1995.  John Clark, James Austin, & D. Alan Henry, ‘Three 
Strikes and You’re Out’: Are Repeat Offender Laws Having Their Anticipated Effects?, 81 
JUDICATURE 144, 144 (1998). 
 240. Rogers, supra note 204, at 160.  Some states specifically require this; others have a 
requirement like this within the statutory language.  Id.  Wyoming is an example of a state that 
explicitly requires this.  Id.  Georgia and Illinois are examples of states that that have comparable 
language in their statutes.  Id.  More specifically, Illinois requires that for a second offense to 
qualify as a second strike, the second offense must be committed after the individual is convicted of 
a first qualifying offense.  Id. at 161.  Nearly all states and the federal government have some type 
of minimum sentencing requirements.  Marguerite A. Driessen & W. Cole Durham, Jr., Sentencing 
Dissonances in the United States: The Shrinking Distance Between Punishment Proposed and 
Sanction Served, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 623, 635 (2002).  Thirty-nine states have truth-in-sentencing 
laws, twenty-four states have strikes laws, and seventeen states have sentencing guidelines for 
certain crimes.  Id.  No state has abolished parole boards or similar organizations that release 
prisoners.  Id. 
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Two other statutes are comparable in harshness to Three Strikes, 
Washington and Texas.241  However, even though Washington’s statute 
is considered harsh, it still requires the third strike to be a serious felony 
rather than just any felony.242  Texas goes beyond this to require the 
third strike to be a violent felony.243 
G.  Three Strikes Is Creating Violence Instead of Decreasing It 
Offenders facing Three Strikes sentencing tend to be more violent 
than they normally would be.244  The type of prison overcrowding as a 
result of Three Strikes is a cause of prison violence.245  Even increased 
recidivism can be traced to prison violence and overcrowding.246  
Increased recidivism and violence runs completely contrary to the goals 
of Three Strikes.247 
 
 241. Mark W. Owens, Note, California’s Three Strikes Law: Desperate Times Require 
Desperate Measures – But Will It Work?, 26 PAC. L.J. 881, 898 (1995). 
 242. Id. at 899.  Washington statutes specifically enumerate the felonies that qualify for each 
strike.  Clark, Austin & Henry, supra note 239, at 145. 
 243. Owens, supra, note 241, at 899.  Texas also permits judges to use their discretion to 
sentence third-strike defendants to lesser sentences.  Id. 
 244. Cowart, supra note 3, at 633.  “Such felons will do whatever it takes to resist arrest by 
police officers, or will threaten, injure, or kill witnesses who may testify against them.”  Id.  For 
example, Kevin Lee Robinson planned to bomb several county administrative buildings in order to 
destroy his criminal records and avoid being sentenced under Three Strikes.  Id. at 666.  Another 
example is Clinton James Warner who committed suicide so that he would not have to serve a 
possible life sentence for drug possession under Three Strikes.  Id.  A high rate of resisting arrest by 
third-strikers has been experienced by San Francisco police officers.  Luna, supra note 228, at 31.  
For criminals serving life or extremely long sentences, the threat of another conviction is unlikely to 
prevent violence against inmates or prison guards.  Id.  The amount of violence against prison 
guards has doubled since the enactment of Three Strikes.  Id.  A Milwaukee, Oregon corrections 
officer, Dave Paul, wrote “[i]magine a law enforcement officer trying to arrest a twice-convicted 
felon who has nothing to lose by using any means necessary to escape.  Expect assaults on police 
and correctional officers to rise precipitously.”  ACLU, 10 Reasons to Oppose “3 Strikes, You’re 
Out,” at http://archive.aclu.org/library/pbr4.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2004). 
 245. Cowart, supra note 3, at 644.  This includes “assaultive or disruptive behavior.”  Id. 
 246. Id.  Prison overcrowding and increased violence can cause recidivism.  Id.  Many 
offenders sentenced under Three Strikes are nonviolent offenders.  Id.  As a result of prison 
violence, these nonviolent criminals may become violent after they are released even though they 
exhibited no violent tendencies before incapacitation.  Id. at 644-45.  In addition, because prisons 
will become filled with third-strikers, officials will have to release other prisoners before they have 
fully served their time.  Luna, supra note 228, at 32.  This may include releasing violent criminals in 
order to make room for recidivist who are most likely at the end of their criminal career.  Id.  See 
also supra note 216 (discussing aging prisoners).  Sherman Block, Los Angeles County Sheriff, had 
to release what he believed to be more violent criminals in order to make room for Three Strikes 
defendants.  Luna, supra note 228, at 32.  Thirty-three thousand inmates in Orange County 
California were released early due to overcrowding in prisons in 1996.  Id.  Sixty-four of the 
inmates released were sex offenders.  Id. 
 247. Cowart, supra note 3, at 645.  See also supra note 204 and accompanying text (discussing 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Three Strikes is the harshest law of its kind in any state and federal 
system, and it is clear that there are serious problems which require its 
repeal.248  The law will prove to cost much more than it will ever save.249  
The policies and benefits that prompted the passage of Three Strikes are 
not being achieved.250  To the contrary, the law may be turning 
nonviolent criminals into violent ones.251  In addition, judicial integrity 
is declining due to the prosecutorial discretion inherent in Three 
Strikes.252 
Even absent the problems that are inherent in Three Strikes, it 
suffers from the most fatal flaw of all; it results in decisions that violate 
the Eighth Amendment.253  The Three Strikes sentence in Lockyer is 
unconstitutional.254  It violated the Eighth Amendment because it was 
disproportionate to the crime committed and, as discussed previously, 
there is a proportionality principle inherent in the Eighth Amendment.255  
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals should have been permitted to 
overturn the sentence under the AEDPA because the decision was 
“contrary to” and an “unreasonable application of” clearly established 
federal law.256  The decision was “contrary to” the law because the trial 
court failed to follow materially indistinguishable precedent, namely 
Solem.257  The decision was also an “unreasonable application of” the 
 
the goals of Three Strikes); Ardaiz, supra note 48, at 1-2 (discussing the same).   
 248. See supra notes 42-43, 235-43 and accompanying text (comparing Three Strikes to the 
same type of law in other states and the federal system). 
 249. See supra notes 215-25 and accompanying text (discussing the financial impact of Three 
Strikes). 
 250. See supra notes 201-11 and accompanying text (discussing the policy goals of Three 
Strikes and whether or not they are being met). 
 251. See supra notes 244-47 and accompanying text (discussing the increase in violence 
caused by Three Strikes). 
 252. See supra notes 231-34 and accompanying text (discussing how prosecutorial discretion is 
causing the loss of judicial integrity). 
 253. See supra notes 155-84 and accompanying text (discussing that there is a 
disproportionality principle in the Eighth Amendment). 
 254. See supra notes 185-203 (discussing why the Supreme Court should have upheld the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that Andrade’s sentence was unconstitutional). 
 255. See supra note 139 (discussing how the sentence in Lockyer was disproportionate to the 
crime committed); 163-92 (discussing that the Eighth Amendment contains a disproportionality 
principle). 
 256. See supra notes 155-84 and accompanying text (discussing how the AEDPA permitted the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to overturn the sentence in Lockyer because it was disproportionate 
and contrary to clearly established precedent, namely Solem). 
 257. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text (finding that Solem is materially 
indistinguishable from Lockyer and should have been applied to Andrade’s sentence to determine 
that it was grossly disproportionate). 
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law because the sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime 
committed.258 
Joy M. Donham 
 
 258. See supra notes 195-199 and accompanying text (discussing that the sentence in Lockyer 
was grossly disproportionate to the crime Andrade committed). 
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